

ASRS Database Report Set

Maintenance Reports

Report Set Description.....A sampling of reports from aircraft maintenance personnel.

Update Number5.0

Date of UpdateJuly 27, 2000

Number of Records in Report Set50

Number of New Records in Report Set.....50

Type of Records in Report SetFor each update, new records received at ASRS will displace a like number of the oldest records in the Report Set, with the objective of providing the fifty most recent relevant ASRS Database records. Records within this Report Set have been screened to assure their relevance to the topic.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Recipients of Aviation Safety Reporting System Data
SUBJECT: Data Derived from ASRS Reports

The attached material is furnished pursuant to a request for data from the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). Recipients of this material are reminded of the following points, which must be considered when evaluating these data.

ASRS reports are submitted voluntarily. The existence in the ASRS database of reports concerning a specific topic cannot, therefore, be used to infer the prevalence of that problem within the National Airspace System.

Reports submitted to ASRS may be amplified by further contact with the individual who submitted them, but the information provided by the reporter is not investigated further. Such information may or may not be correct in any or all respects. At best, it represents the perception of a specific individual who may or may not understand all of the factors involved in a given issue or event.

After preliminary processing, all ASRS reports are de-identified. Following de-identification, there is no way to identify the individual who submitted a report. All ASRS report processing systems are designed to protect identifying information submitted by reports, such as, names, company affiliations, and specific times of incident occurrence. There is, therefore, no way to verify information submitted in an ASRS report after it has been de-identified.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and its ASRS contractor, Battelle Memorial Institute, specifically disclaim any responsibility for any interpretation which may be made by others of any material or data furnished by NASA in response to queries of the ASRS database and related materials.

Linda J. Connell, Director
Aviation Safety Reporting System

CAVEAT REGARDING STATISTICAL USE OF ASRS INFORMATION

Certain caveats apply to the use of ASRS statistical data. All ASRS reports are voluntarily submitted, and thus cannot be considered a measured random sample of the full population of like events. For example, we receive several thousand altitude deviation reports each year. This number may comprise over half of all the altitude deviations that occur, or it may be just a small fraction of total occurrences. We have no way of knowing which.

Moreover, not all pilots, controllers, air carriers, or other participants in the aviation system, are equally aware of the ASRS or equally willing to report to us. Thus, the data reflect **reporting biases**. These biases, which are not fully known or measurable, distort ASRS statistics. A safety problem such as near midair collisions (NMACs) may appear to be more highly concentrated in area "A" than area "B" simply because the airmen who operate in area "A" are more supportive of the ASRS program and more inclined to report to us should an NMAC occur.

Only one thing can be known for sure from ASRS statistics—they represent the **lower measure** of the true number of such events that are occurring. For example, if ASRS receives 300 reports of track deviations in 1993 (this number is purely hypothetical), then it can be known with certainty that at least 300 such events have occurred in 1993.

Because of these statistical limitations, we believe that the **real power** of ASRS lies in the **report narratives**. Here pilots, controllers, and others, tell us about aviation safety incidents and situations in detail. They explain what happened, and more importantly, **why** it happened. Using report narratives effectively requires an extra measure of study, the knowledge derived is well worth the added effort.

For text on the strengths and limitations of incident data, the process of using incidents for human factors evaluations, statistical analysis methods and other sources of incident data, see:

Chappell, S.L. (1994). Using voluntary incident reports for human factors evaluations. In N. Johnston, N. McDonald & R. Fuller (Eds.), *Aviation Psychology in Practice*. Aldershot, England: Ashgate.

ACN: 431031

Time

Date : 199903

Day : Mon

Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft / 1

Make Model : B757-200

Component / 1

Aircraft Component : Nose Gear Tire

Aircraft Reference : X

Problem : Not Installed

Person / 1

ASRS Report : 431031

Person / 2

Function.Oversight : Supervisor

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolutory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other : Maintenance Action

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

WHILE CHANGING THE L NOSE TIRE ON ACFT XYZ, I HAD A SUPVR WATCHING OVER ME BECAUSE THE DOOR/HANGAR SPACE WAS NEEDED FOR ANOTHER ACFT TRYING TO GET THE JOB DONE IN A TIMELY MANNER. I INADVERTENTLY LEFT THE AXLE WASHER ON THE OLD TIRE ASSEMBLY. THIS WAS DISCOVERED BY OUR TIRE SHOP WHEN THE TIRE WAS BEING REBUILT. LINE MAINT WAS NOTIFIED AND A CALLOUT TO INSPECT THE ACFT WAS GENERATED.

Synopsis :

A B757-200 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH THE L NOSE GEAR WHEEL AND TIRE ASSEMBLY INSTALLED IMPROPERLY. AXLE WASHER NOT INSTALLED.

Time

Date : 199903

Day : Sat

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft / 1

Make Model : Embraer Undifferentiated or Other Model

Component / 1

Aircraft Component : Wheel Assemblies

Aircraft Reference : X

Problem : Malfunctioning

Person / 1

ASRS Report : 431286

Person / 2

Function.Oversight : PIC

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Experience.Flight Time.Total : 4425

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 250

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 500

ASRS Report : 431536

Person / 4

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Person / 5

Function.Controller : Local

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolutive Action.Flight Crew : Landed As Precaution

Resolutive Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance

Resolutive Action.None Taken : Unable

Consequence.Other : Flight Cancelled

Consequence.Other : Maintenance Action

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

ON MAR/XB/99, PLT NOTED ON TKOF, LNDG GEAR WOULD NOT RETRACT. ACFT SUCCESSFULLY LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. ON MAR/XA/99, A MECH AND I CHANGED THE NOSE TIRES ON THIS PARTICULAR ACFT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ACFT MAINT MANUAL. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE ACFT ARRIVED WITH A PLT'S RPT OF MODERATE TO SEVERE NOSE GEAR VIBRATION ON TKOF AND LNDG. THE RPTR SAID THE NOSE GEAR WAS JACKED AND THE WHEELS SPUN, WHICH REVEALED THE NOSE GEAR TIRES WERE OVAL SHAPED AND WERE THE SOURCE OF THE SHIMMY. THE RPTR SAID BOTH NOSE GEAR TIRES WERE REPLACED PER THE MAINT MANUAL WITH SVCABLE TIRE AND WHEEL ASSEMBLIES AND WERE ROTATED BEFORE AND AFTER CORRECT TORQUE APPLIED TO THE AXLE NUTS. THE ACFT WAS DISPATCHED AND AFTER TKOF WAS UNABLE TO RETRACT THE NOSE LNDG GEAR AND A FLY-BY REVEALED THE NOSE GEAR WHEELS AT 90 DEGS. THE RPTR STATED WHEN THE ACFT TOUCHED DOWN THE WHEELS ALIGNED NORMALLY. THE RPTR SAID THE NOSE LNDG GEAR WAS CHKED AND IT WAS DISCOVERED THE R WHEEL BEARINGS HAD SEIZED. THE RPTR STATED THE FAA WAS INVESTIGATING THE BEARING FAILURE AND A LETTER WAS SENT TO THE RPTR. THE RPTR SAID THE ENTIRE NOSE LNDG GEAR WAS REPLACED AFTER THIS INCIDENT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 431536: WHEN WE BROUGHT THE GEAR LEVER SELECTOR TO THE 'UP' POS, AFTER A POSITIVE RATE OF CLB. THE NOSE GEAR DID NOT GO UP AND WE RECEIVED AN UNSAFE/NOT UP AND LOCKED INDICATION ON OUR EICAS. QRH HAD US CYCLE THE GEAR AND WE HAD 3 DOWN AND GREEN INDICATIONS. WE TALKED WITH MAINT AND DISPATCH AND WE ALL AGREED TO DO A FLY-BY TO MAKE SURE GEAR WAS OK, AS IF NOSE/TAXI LIGHT WERE ON, IT WAS REALLY DOWN AND LOCKED. WE EXECUTED A FLY-BY AT 500 FT AGL AND ON THE MISSED APCH WERE TOLD THAT THE NOSE GEAR WAS COCKED 75 DEGS TO R OF CTRLINE. ON GND, WE LOOKED AT R TIRE ASSEMBLY AND THE BEARINGS WERE DISINTEGRATED AND THE TIRE WAS HANGING ON BY A PIN AND A PIECE OF SAFETY WIRE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE R NOSE TIRE AND WHEEL ASSEMBLY FAILED DUE TO A WHEEL BEARING BEING INSTALLED BACKWARDS BY THE SHOP. THE RPTR SAID MAINT ADVISED THAT THE REASON THE NOSE GEAR STRUT CTRING CAMS DID NOT STRAIGHTEN THE WHEELS WAS THE LOWER STRUT WAS TURNED APPROX 75 DEGS TO THE R OF CTR AND TURNED BEYOND THE 40 DEG LIMIT OF THE CTRING CAMS. THE RPTR SAID HE HAS 500 HRS ON THE EMB145 AND HAS EXPERIENCED ONLY LIGHT NOSE GEAR SHIMMY.

Synopsis :

AN EMBRAER 145 AFTER TKOF WAS UNABLE TO RETRACT THE NOSE LNDG GEAR. NOSE GEAR TIRE AND WHEEL ASSEMBLIES WERE REPLACED PRIOR TO FLT.

ACN: 449584

Time

Date : 199909

Day : Fri

Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Component / 1

Aircraft Component : Oil Filler Cap

Aircraft Reference : X

Problem : Improperly Operated

Person / 1

ASRS Report : 449584

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other : Maintenance Action

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

ACCOMPLISHED DAILY CHK AND ON R ENG I NOTICED NO OIL IN SIGHT GAUGE AND REMOVED CAP AND CHKED OIL WITH DIPSTICK AND REINSTALLED CAP AND LOCKED IT DOWN. MY LEAD WATCHED ME CHK OIL AND INSTALLATION OF CAP. AFTER BREAK, THE PLANE WAS TAKEN TO RUNUP PAD FOR AUTOPACK SHUTDOWN. IT FAILED TEST AND VALVE WAS REPLACED AND RETURNED TO PAD FOR A SECOND RUN. DAYLIGHT SHIFT CONTINUED WITH THE REPAIR AND RELEASED IT FOR SVC AND PLACED ON THE GATE FOR FLT. ACFT DISPATCHED TO ORD. UPON ARR AT GATE, OIL WAS FOUND LOW AND CAP FOUND LOOSE.

Synopsis :

AN MD80 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH THE R ENG OIL SVC CAP NOT SECURED.

ACN: 449642

Time

Date : 199909

Day : Sun

Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Component / 1

Aircraft Component : Trailing Edge Flap

Aircraft Reference : X

Problem : Improperly Operated

Person / 1

ASRS Report : 449642

Person / 2

Function.Oversight : Supervisor

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Unable

Consequence.Other : Aircraft Damaged

Consequence.Other : Maintenance Action

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

DURING OPS CHK OF FLAPS/SLATS, FLAPS WERE LOWERED ON TO A LADDER CAUSING A 2 INCH DENT/CRACK ON L INBOARD TRAILING EDGE FLAP, THE HONEYCOMB MATERIAL WAS SEALED WITH PRO SEAL AND HI SPD TAPE INSTALLED PER MAINT CTL AND SRM 57. I WAS NOT SURE THAT THE ABOVE TEMP REPAIR WAS LEGAL, BUT FOLLOWED MAINT CTL'S INSTRUCTION BY INSTALLING THE HIGH SPD TAPE, THE ACFT WAS RELEASED FOR POSITIONING FLT.

Synopsis :

A B737-500 INCURRED DAMAGE TO THE L INBOARD TRAILING EDGE FLAP DURING AN OPS CHK WHEN LOWERED ONTO A LADDER.

Time

Date : 199909

Day : Mon

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Component / 1

Aircraft Component : Cockpit Window

Aircraft Reference : X

Problem : Failed

Person / 1

ASRS Report : 449812

Person / 2

Function.Oversight : PIC

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Person / 3

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 2

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 3

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

Consequence.Other : Aircraft Damaged

Consequence.Other : Maintenance Action

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

I FEEL ACFT XYZ WAS FLOWN IN AN UNSAFE CONDITION ON FLT ABC BJX (LEON, MEXICO) TO DFW. ON THE PREVIOUS FLT XXX, THE CAPT WROTE UP 'L WINDOW HEAT WENT INOP AT FL350 FOLLOWED BY OUTER PANE CRACKING.' THE ACFT DEPARTED BJX ON FLT ABC TO DFW WITH NO ACTION. TAKEN, OR INSPECTION BY MAINT, THE CAPT'S WINDSHIELD WAS SHATTERED WITH A LONG BURN OR ARCED LINE ALONG THE ENTIRE BOTTOM EDGE OF THE WINDOW. THIS CONDITION EXTREMELY OBSCURED THE VIEW FROM THE CAPT'S POS.

Synopsis :

A FOKKER 100 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH A FAILED WINDSHIELD HEAT, CRACKED WINDSHIELD AND WINDSHIELD VISION IMPAIRED WITH NO INSPECTION OR MAINT LOG ENTRY.

ACN: 449814

Time

Date : 199909

Day : Tue

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Component / 1

Aircraft Component : Leading Edge Slat

Aircraft Reference : X

Problem : Improperly Operated

Person / 1

ASRS Report : 449814

Person / 2

ASRS Report : 449815

Person / 3

Function.Oversight : Supervisor

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other : Aircraft Damaged

Consequence.Other : Maintenance Action

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

A DENT WAS FOUND ON THE LEADING EDGE OF THE L-HAND #1 SLAT ON A LINE CHK. IT WAS INSPECTED AND DETERMINED TO BE WITHIN LIMITS PER MGMNT'S INSTRUCTIONS ON MEASUREMENT PROC. AFTER FURTHER REVIEW, IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT BOTH THE MEASUREMENT AND PROC WERE INCORRECT.

Synopsis :

AN MD SUPER 80 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH LEADING EDGE SLAT DAMAGE THAT WAS BEYOND STRUCTURAL MANUAL REPAIR LIMITS.

Time

Date : 199909

Day : Sun

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Component / 1

Aircraft Component : Vertical Stabilizer/Fin

Aircraft Reference : X

Person / 1

ASRS Report : 450208

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Unable

Consequence.Other : Maintenance Action

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

ON SEP/XA/99, I REPLACED 1 BARREL NUT FOR THE VERT STABILIZER ATTACH BOLTS. WHEN TORQUING BOLT, I USED THE TORQUE VALUE GIVEN ON THE PENDING AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE CARD XZZX (1800-2200 INCH LBS). THE TORQUE VALUE GIVEN IN THE ACR JOB CARD IS 7800-8800 INCH LBS.

Synopsis :

A B767 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH AN AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE WITH A VERT STABILIZER BARREL NUT REPLACED BUT NOT TORQUED CORRECTLY.

ACN: 450217

Time

Date : 199909

Day : Wed

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Component / 1

Aircraft Component : Indicating and Warning - Flight & Navigation Systems

Aircraft Reference : X

Problem : Malfunctioning

Person / 1

ASRS Report : 450217

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Documentation

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Unable

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

HAD PIREP OF HORIZON LIGHT ON FO'S FLT MODE ANNUNCIATOR FLASHING. RERACKED #2 COMPASS RACK. ACCOMPLISHED OPS CHKS -- ALL CHKS NORMAL. I ACCIDENTALLY PULLED AND RERACKED COMPARATOR MONITOR INSTEAD OF #2 COMPASS RACK BECAUSE IT STUCK IN MY HEAD AFTER REVIEWING LOGBOOK.

Synopsis :

AN MD SUPER 80 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH THE INCORRECT CORRECTIVE ACTION ENTERED IN THE LOGBOOK.

ACN: 450238

Time

Date : 199909

Day : Wed

Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Component / 1

Aircraft Component : Nozzle

Aircraft Reference : X

Person / 1

ASRS Report : 450238

Person / 3

Function.Oversight : Supervisor

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Documentation

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Unable

Consequence.Other : Maintenance Action

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

ON SEP/XA/99 I WAS SENT TO DO A JOB CARD REPETITIVE INSPECTION OF #7 FUEL NOZZLE ON #1 (L-HAND) ENG ON ACFT XYZ. BECAUSE I HAD NOT DONE THIS INSPECTION BEFORE, I WAS ASSISTED BY A FORMER ACR MECH WHO HAD DONE SEVERAL OF THESE BORESCOPES BEFORE. ON SEP/XE/99 WHEN I ARRIVED AT WORK, OUR DEPT WAS MEETING WITH ACR WXXW ACR QUALITY ASSURANCE SUPVR. AFTER HE LEFT, WHILE REVIEWING SOME PAPERWORK HE LEFT BEHIND, I REALIZED I HAD INSPECTED #4 NOT #7 FUEL NOZZLE.

Synopsis :

AN MD80 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE AFTER A REPETITIVE #1 ENG #7 NOZZLE INSPECTION. LATER DISCOVERED #4 NOZZLE WAS INSPECTED IN ERROR.

Time

Date : 199909

Day : Thu

Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : DCA.Airport

State Reference : DC

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Component / 1

Aircraft Component : Air Conditioning Distribution System

Aircraft Reference : X

Problem : Malfunctioning

Person / 1

Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot

Experience.Flight Time.Total : 3800

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 200

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 700

ASRS Report : 450243

Person / 2

Function.Controller : Ground

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Other Anomaly : Smoke Or Fire

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other : Flight Cancelled

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Environmental Factor

Narrative :

WHILE TAXIING AT DCA, THE CABIN QUICKLY FILLED WITH SMOKE. THE HEATER WAS OPERATING AND HAD BEEN USED PREVIOUSLY IN THE SEASON. I PULLED ONTO THE RAMP AND TOLD GND CTL THAT I THOUGHT I HAD A HEATER FIRE WHILE SHUTTING THE HEATER OFF AND THE AIRPLANE DOWN. THE FIRE DEPT RESPONDED AND ALSO DETERMINED THAT THE SOURCE OF THE PROB WAS THE HEATER. NO FIRE DAMAGE WAS EVIDENT AND THE SMOKE APPEARED TO BE THE WORST THAT OCCURRED. I ARRANGED FOR A CHARTER PLANE FOR MY 2 PAX AND AS AN A&P, PERFORMED A VISUAL INSPECTION AND OPS CHK OF THE HEATER. THERE WAS EVIDENCE OF A BIRD STRIKE JUST FORWARD OF THE HEATER AIR INLET ON THE LOWER R SIDE NOSE OF THE AIRPLANE. IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE HEATER HAD INGESTED SOME OF THE BIRD REMAINS AND HAD BURNED THEM WHEN THE HEATER WAS TURNED ON. I PERFORMED A LOGBOOK ENTRY REFLECTING THAT I HAD PERFORMED A VISUAL AND OPS CHK OF THE HEATER AND RETURNED THE ACFT TO SERVICE. I THEN FLEW THE AIRPLANE TO ZZZ ON AN IFR FLT PLAN. NO PROBS WERE ENCOUNTERED AND AS A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE, THE HEATER WAS TORN DOWN AND INSPECTED BY OUR MAINT FAC. THEY ALSO AGREED THAT THE HEATER AIR INLET HAD INGESTED A PORTION OF A BIRD.

Synopsis :

A PIPER PA31 PLT HAD SMOKE IN THE CABIN DURING TAXI FROM DCA.

ACN: 450255

Time

Date : 199909

Day : Thu

Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Component / 1

Aircraft Component : Pressurization System

Aircraft Reference : X

Person / 1

ASRS Report : 450255

Person / 2

Function.Oversight : Supervisor

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Unable

Consequence.Other : Company Review

Consequence.Other : Maintenance Action

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

I REPLACED #1 AND #2 CABIN PRESSURIZATION CONTROLLERS. I ACCOMPLISHED THE BITE CHKS FOR BOTH CONTROLLERS BUT I FORGOT THAT I HAD TO ACCOMPLISH A STATIC LEAK CHK. I NOTIFIED ABC WZXX GF ZZZ AFT LINE AT XD45 SO HE COULD NOTIFY MAINT TECHNICIAN TO SCHEDULE A STATIC CHK. THIS EVENT OCCURRED SHORTLY AFTER ACFT DEPARTED ZZZ.

Synopsis :

AN MD SUPER 80 WAS DISPATCHED AND OPERATED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH #1 AND #2 PRESSURE CONTROLLERS REPLACED AND REQUIRED PITOT STATIC NOT ACCOMPLISHED.

ACN: 450264

Time

Date : 199909

Day : Fri

Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : RDU.Airport

State Reference : NC

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Person / 1

Function.Oversight : PIC

Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot

Experience.Flight Time.Total : 1450

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 45

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 220

ASRS Report : 450264

Person / 2

Function.Controller : Radar

Events

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication

Narrative :

I HAVE OBSERVED THAT THE SHARON HARRIS NUCLEAR PWR PLANT SW OF THE RDU ARPT IS CHARTED INCORRECTLY OR MISREPRESENTED. ALTHOUGH THIS DISCREPANCY DID NOT CAUSE AN UNSAFE CONDITION IN OUR FLT OPS, IT POTENTIALLY COULD FOR SOME PLTS DEPENDING ON THE TYPE OF FLT OPS THEY ARE INVOLVED IN. THE PWR PLANT STACKS ARE ACTUALLY LOCATED ON THE N SIDE OF THE ASSOCIATED LAKE. THE CHART SHOWS THE WORDS 'PWR PLANT' ON THE SW SIDE OF THE LAKE WITH 'STACKS' LISTED ABOVE THAT. THERE IS NO REF TO WHERE THE STACKS ARE LOCATED SPECIFICALLY. ADDITIONALLY, THERE IS A 'CHK POINT' REF OVER 2 TWRs. HOWEVER, IN REALITY ONLY 1 TWR SHOULD BE DEPICTED FOR THIS 'CHK POINT.' PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN THIS INQUIRY MAY WANT TO REVIEW AERIAL PHOTOS OF THIS AREA TO CORRECT THIS SIT.

Synopsis :

A STATE GOV PLT RPTED HIS PERCEPTION THAT THE CHARLOTTE SECTIONAL EITHER MISREPRESENTED, OR CHARTED INCORRECTLY, TWR STACKS NEAR A NUCLEAR PWR PLANT.

ACN: 450275

Time

Date : 199909

Day : Fri

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Component / 1

Aircraft Component : Fuselage Tail Cone

Aircraft Reference : X

Person / 1

ASRS Report : 450275

Person / 2

Function.Oversight : Supervisor

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Documentation

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Unable

Consequence.Other : Aircraft Damaged

Consequence.Other : Maintenance Action

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

A DENT IN TAIL CONE EXISTS ON ACFT XYZ. IT WAS INSPECTED IN ZZZ ON JUL/XA/99, DAMAGE LOG #XYXXX, AND FOUND WITHIN LIMITS PER SRM. ON SEP/XA/99 A DEFERRAL WAS ISSUED #XYWW WHICH WAS UPDATED AFTER EVALUATING THE TIME OF ESTIMATED COMPLETION OF THE REPAIR. IT WAS CLR THE ACFT WOULD NOT MAKE SCHEDULE. THE DENT IS NOT GOING TO AFFECT THE ACFT'S AIRWORTHINESS, SO WE DEFERRED IT UNTIL A TIME WHEN WE COULD HAVE THE ACFT ON GND FOR REPAIR 3 DAYS.

Synopsis :

A DC10-10 TAIL CONE DENT WAS EVALUATED AND FOUND OK FOR SVC. LATER CHKED IN A MAINT VISIT AND FOUND OUT OF LIMITS AND REPAIR REQUIRED.

Time

Date : 199909

Day : Mon

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Component / 1

Aircraft Component : Wing Spar

Aircraft Reference : X

Person / 1

ASRS Report : 450322

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other : Company Review

Consequence.Other : Maintenance Action

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

I AM AN INDIVIDUAL WORKING THE A320 HVY MAINT VISIT IN ZZZ. OUR A320 ACFT HAVE BEEN HAVING PROBS WITH FUEL LEAKS IN THE 4GA JACK BOLT FITTINGS FOR THE MAIN LNDG GEAR IN THE RIB #3 AREA. THE REPAIR WAS A TEMPORARY MAINT APPROVAL YY-ZZZ ISSUED FROM ACR ZZZ ENGINEERING (ACR) DATED MAY/99. LEAKS HAVE BEEN REPAIRED USING THIS TEMPORARY MAINT APPROVAL. THE TEMPORARY MAINT APPROVAL (YY-ZZZ) STATED TO TORQUE THE 4 BOLTS AT RIB #3 ON THE MAIN LNDG GEAR FITTING TO 48-52 INCH LBS. BEAR IN MIND THIS TEMPORARY MAINT APPROVAL (YY-ZZZ) WAS USED FOR LEAKS IN THIS AREA FOR LEAKS AS A STANDARD REPAIR. THE TORQUE FOR THESE BOLTS WAS QUESTIONED IN SEP/99 BY SEVERAL FUEL TANK WORKERS AS BEING TOO LOW. ON SEP/XA/99 I WAS WORKING ON A FUEL TEAM SEALING THE 4 BOLTS IN QUESTION ON THE L WING OF AN A320 WHEN ONE OF MY CO-WORKERS WAS INFORMED BY INSPECTION THAT CHANGES HAVE BEEN MADE TO TEMPORARY MAINT APPROVAL YY-ZZZ. THE INDIVIDUAL SPOKE WITH AND RECEIVED TEMPORARY MAINT APPROVAL YY-ZZZ REVISION A DATED JUN/99 WHICH STATED THAT THE TORQUE WAS CHANGED TO 48-52 FT LBS. THE NEW TEMPORARY MAINT APPROVAL (YY-ZZZ REVISION A) DID NOT MAKE IT TO THE WORK AREA TILL SEP/XB/99, AFFECTING SEVERAL ACFT NOW IN REVENUE SVC.

Synopsis :

SEVERAL AIRBUS A320'S WERE RELEASED FOR SVC IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH THE JACK BOLT FITTING FASTENERS TORQUED INCORRECTLY.

ACN: 450401

Time

Date : 199909

Day : Wed

Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Component / 1

Aircraft Component : Fuselage Skin

Aircraft Reference : X

Problem : Failed

Person / 1

Function.Oversight : Supervisor

ASRS Report : 450401

Person / 3

Function.Oversight : Supervisor

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Unable

Consequence.Other : Flight Cancelled

Consequence.Other : Maintenance Action

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

ON SEP/XA/99 AT XC30, RECEIVED A CALL FROM MAINT IN ZZZ IN REGARDS TO A DEFERRED ITEM ON A DC10-10. ITEM WAS PREVIOUSLY DEFERRED BACK ON AUG/XC/99 IN ZZZ. THE ITEM CONCERNED A QUILTED SKIN AND SOME MINOR CORROSION AND ONE DISHED RIVET HEAD. I AUTH THE DEFERRAL AT THE TIME PER OUR MAINT MANUAL TO THE NEXT MAINT CHK WITH THE CONDITION THAT THE AREA BE RECHKED AT THE NEXT 'A' CHK. 90 FLT HRS LATER, THE ACFT WAS BACK IN ZZZ AND AREA WAS RECHKED AND FOUND TO BE ACCEPTABLE. ACFT WAS IN ZZZ ON SEP/YY/99 FOR A MAINT CHK. ZZZ MAINT CALLED ME TO BREAK OR EXTEND THE DEFERRAL ON THIS ITEM. AFTER REVIEWING THE DEFERRAL AGAIN, I REALIZED I HAD ERRED IN MY ORIGINAL AUTH FOR DEFERRAL. THE DISCREPANCY SHOULD HAVE BEEN DEFERRED FOR 100 HRS VERSUS LETTING THE CONDITION CONTINUE UNTIL MAINT CHK. ZZZ ACCOMPLISHED A REPAIR WITH ENGINEERING ASSISTANCE AND ACFT CONTINUED ON WITH A NEW DEFERRAL. IN QUICK HASTE, I MUST'VE AUTH THE ORIGINAL DEFERRAL TO MAINT CHK MISINTERPING THE SET GUIDELINES IN THE MAINT MANUAL SPECS. THE DEFERRAL SHOULD'VE BEEN JUST FOR 100 HRS FOR ENGINEERING TO RE-EVALUATE.

Synopsis :

A DC10-10 WAS DISPATCHED AND OPERATED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH LOWER FUSELAGE SKIN CORROSION BEYOND ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.

ACN: 450542

Time

Date : 199909

Day : Thu

Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Person / 1

ASRS Report : 450452

Person / 3

Function.Controller : Combined Ground

Function.Controller : Local

Function.Controller : Radar

Events

Anomaly.Incursion : Runway

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3

Resolutive Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

DURING TAXI FROM THE GATE TO THE MAINT BASE, MY PARTNER, WHO WAS WORKING THE RADIO CONTACT WITH THE TWR, MISUNDERSTOOD THE TWR TO CROSS RWY 28L&R, TXWY S TO THE GATE. MY PARTNER CALLED BACK 'CLR TO CROSS THE RWYS 28, TXWY S TO THE GATE.' THE CTLR DID NOT GET BACK ON THE RADIO TO CHALLENGE MY PARTNER'S CALL BACK. AS A RESULT, WE CROSSED RWY 28L&R, TXWY S TO THE GATE. WE DID NOT PUT ANYONE IN DANGER BECAUSE THERE WAS NO ACFT TAKING OFF. THE CTLR WAS NEW AND I BELIEVE HE DID CLR US TO CROSS, BUT WHO KNOWS. ONE FACTOR MAY HAVE BEEN THE TIME -- IT WAS AROUND XA00. THE TWR MAY HAVE BEEN TIRED.

Synopsis :

A MAINT CREW WAS TAXIING A B737 FROM THE HANGAR TO THE TERMINAL AND CROSSED THE PARALLEL RWYS BELIEVING THEY HAD BEEN CLRED BY THE TWR.

Time

Date : 199909

Day : Thu

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Component / 1

Aircraft Component : Throttle/Power Level

Aircraft Reference : X

Problem : Malfunctioning

Person / 1

ASRS Report : 450635

Person / 2

Function.Oversight : PIC

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Person / 4

Function.Flight Crew : Second Officer

Person / 3

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Events

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 2

Consequence.Other : Company Review

Consequence.Other : Maintenance Action

Situations

Aircraft.Make Model.Value : 148.31

Aircraft.Aircraft Component.Value : 76.1

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

I WAS THE INSPECTOR ON A REMOVE AND REPLACE (R&R) OF THE ACFT PUSH-PULL CABLE ASSEMBLY ON #1 ENG THRUST REVERSER. WE REMOVE AND REPLACE PER THE MAINT MANUAL AND ACCOMPLISHED THE OPS CHK. THE ACFT RETURNED BACK TO THE HANGAR WHEN THE PLT SQUAWKED THAT THE #1 ENG THROTTLE BINDED DURING HIS PREFLT INSPECTION. MAINT FOUND THAT THE FORWARD CABLE ASSEMBLY ON THE PUSH-PULL ASSEMBLY NEEDED ADJUSTMENT. AFTER ADJUSTMENT, THE THROTTLE OPERATED WITHOUT BINDING. THE ACFT WAS RETURNED TO SVC. DURING INITIAL MAINT ON THE AFT PORTION OF THE PUSH-PULL ASSEMBLY IT WAS DECIDED THAT THE FORWARD SECTION RIG DIDN'T NEED TO BE CHKD BECAUSE, THE AFT SECTION REMOVE AND REPLACE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON THE RIG BECAUSE THE AFT SECTION OF THE PUSH-PULL ASSEMBLY CANNOT BE ADJUSTED. WE OPEN AND CLOSED THE THRUST REVERSER SEVERAL TIMES BUT DID NOT PUSH THE THROTTLE FORWARD, THUS MISSING THE BINDING OF THE THROTTLE.

Synopsis :

A B727-100 DURING PREFLT INSPECTION FOUND THE #1 ENG THROTTLE BINDING CAUSED BY LACK OF ADJUSTMENT AFTER #1 THRUST REVERSER REPLACEMENT.

ACN: 450813

Time

Date : 199909

Day : Sat

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ORD.Airport

State Reference : IL

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Person / 1

ASRS Report : 450813

Person / 2

Function.Oversight : PIC

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Person / 4

Function.Controller : Ground

Person / 3

Function.Controller : Local

Events

Anomaly.Conflict : Ground Less Severe

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Required Legal Separation

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Airport

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas : FAA

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

THIS LETTER IS TO PROVIDE INFO ABOUT A SAFETY ISSUE AT ORD ARPT. DURING CURRENT OPS, THE RWY 32R HOLD PAD AND TXWY P ARE CLOSED DUE TO CONSTRUCTION. B BRIDGE TO RWY 32R TO TXWY H IS AN ALTERNATE RTE CURRENTLY IN USE. THE USE OF THIS RTE AT NIGHT OR DURING LOW VISIBILITY CONDITIONS COULD LEAD TO A SERIOUS ACCIDENT. AFTER A RWY INCURSION IN SEP/99 AND SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATIONS WITH OTHER TAXI AND FLCS, THESE SAFETY FACTORS HAVE COME TO MY ATTN: 1) ACFT LNDG ON RWY 9L, AND TAXIING ACFT USING THE ALTERNATE TAXI RTE, ARE COMING NOSE-TO-NOSE ON RWY 32R OR TXWY P, CAUSING THE ACFT CLRING RWY 9L TO STOP ON THE RWY. 2) AT NIGHT AND DURING POOR VISIBILITY, THIS PROB IS COMPOUNDED BY NOT BEING ABLE TO SEE THE APCH END OF RWY 9L FROM YOUR POS ON RWY 32R PRIOR TO TURNING ONTO TXWY H. 3) THE TIMING FOR TURNING ONTO TXWY H FROM RWY 32R IS CRITICAL IN THAT ENOUGH TIME OR SPACING MUST BE ALLOWED FOR TFC LNDG ON RWY 9L TO CLR THE RWY. I FEEL THE TEMPORARY TAXI RTE SHOULD NOT BE USED AT NIGHT OR DURING LOW VISIBILITY CONDITIONS. THIS RTE HAS THE POTENTIAL TO BE THE CATALYST OF A CHAIN OF EVENTS LEADING TO A VERY SERIOUS ACCIDENT.

Synopsis :

TAXI MECH HAD TROUBLE AROUND THE AREA CLOSED FOR CONSTRUCTION AT ORD.

ACN: 450962

Time

Date : 199910

Day : Mon

Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Component / 1

Aircraft Component : Ground Spoiler

Aircraft Reference : X

Problem : Malfunctioning

Person / 1

ASRS Report : 450962

Person / 2

ASRS Report : 450965

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other : Company Review

Consequence.Other : Maintenance Action

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

DURING TROUBLESHOOTING OF 'SPOILER' EICAS MESSAGE, #13 SPOILER PCU WAS REPLACED PER MAINT MANUAL. (SHIP XYZ.) THIS OCCURRED OCT/MON/99, AROUND XA00-XD00. THE PLANE WAS SUBSEQUENTLY RELEASED AND FLEW WITHOUT INCIDENT. LATER OCT/TUE/99 AFTERNOON IT WAS BROUGHT TO MY ATTN THAT THE LIST OF RII (REQUIRED INSPECTION ITEMS) HAD CHANGED LAST APR/XA/99, IN OUR TOPP (TECHNICAL OPS POLICY AND PROC MANUAL), AND WHERE NO RII WAS REQUIRED PREVIOUSLY FOR REPLACEMENT IN A LINE MAINT SIT, IT NOW WAS REQUIRED. UPON DISCOVERY OF OUR OMISSION, I SET UP TO HAVE THE INSPECTION PERFORMED BY QUALITY ASSURANCE DURING ITS NEXT TRANSIT TO ZZZ, OCT/WED/99. THE INSPECTION WAS PERFORMED AND DOCUMENTED IN ACFT LOGBOOK. I ALSO INITIATED A MAINT ADVISORY TO BRING HEIGHTENED AWARENESS TO THE RII CHANGE. NORMALLY CHANGES TO TOPPS ARE A 'READ AND SIGN,' SO ALL ARE AWARE OF THE CHANGE. IN MY CASE, I HAD BEEN INVOLVED WITH THE B777 PROGRAM, HAD NO 'READ AND SIGNS' FOR ABOUT THE LAST YR, AND WAS UNAWARE OF THE CHANGE. A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WOULD BE NO INSPECTION OR RII CALLED FOR IN MAINT MANUAL.

Synopsis :

A B777-200ER WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH A #13 SPOILER PWR CTL UNTIL REPLACED WITHOUT THE REQUIRED INSPECTION ACCOMPLISHED.

ACN: 451371

Time

Date : 199909

Day : Wed

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Component / 1

Aircraft Component : Cabin Furnishing

Aircraft Reference : X

Problem : Malfunctioning

Person / 1

ASRS Report : 451371

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.FAA : Investigated

Consequence.Other : Company Review

Consequence.Other : Maintenance Action

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

ON OCT/XA/99 AT XA00, ACR NOTIFIED ME OF A CEILING PANEL I HAD REINSTALLED HAD FALLEN DOWN 4 DAYS LATER AND THE FAA HAS SENT A NOTICE OF INVESTIGATION TO ACR QUESTIONING THE MAINT PERFORMED ON THE ACFT. THE PANEL I REINSTALLED IS JUST AFT OF THE COCKPIT DOOR WITH 4 BAYONET FASTENERS SECURING THE PANEL (SEE IPC REF 25-24-00-01B WHICH IS ENCLOSED). THE MAINT I PERFORMED WAS PER ACR MAINT PROCS -- ALL 4 BAYONETS WERE SECURE IN PANEL, AND NO TAPE WAS USED ON THIS PANEL.

Synopsis :

A FOKKER 100 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH A CABIN CEILING IMPROPERLY INSTALLED.

ACN: 451386

Time

Date : 199909

Day : Thu

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Component / 1

Aircraft Component : Rudder

Aircraft Reference : X

Problem : Improperly Operated

Person / 1

ASRS Report : 451386

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Consequence.Other : Aircraft Damaged

Consequence.Other : Maintenance Action

Situations

Aircraft.Make Model.Value : 148.72

Aircraft.Aircraft Component.Value : 55.21

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

WHILE ATTEMPTING TO PERFORM A LEAK CHK ON THE RUDDER YAW DAMPER SERVOS, THE RUDDER WAS APPARENTLY MOVED BY SOMEONE IN THE COCKPIT CAUSING IT TO RUN INTO THE TAILSTAND, LEADING TO EXTENSIVE TRAILING EDGE DAMAGE. I DOCUMENTED THE DAMAGE ON A WRITE-UP REPAIR FORM AS REQUIRED.

Synopsis :

A B767-300 PARKED IN A HANGAR INCURS RUDDER DAMAGE WHEN CTL IS OPERATED AND STRIKES TAIL WORK STAND.

Time

Date : 199910

Day : Fri

Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft / 1

Make Model : MD-90 Series (DC-9-90) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Person / 1

ASRS Report : 451769

Person / 2

Function.Oversight : PIC

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

ASRS Report : 451222

Person / 5

Function.Controller : Local

Person / 3

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Anomaly.Other Anomaly : Smoke Or Fire

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 2

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 3

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Declared Emergency

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other : Company Review

Consequence.Other : Maintenance Action

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

ON THE OCT/XA/99, I WAS PERFORMING MAINT ON ACFT XYZ AN MD90 ACFT OF ACR XX. I WAS PERFORMING MAINT ON THE #1 ENG, 'B' FIRE LOOP SYS. I REPAIRED THE SYS. I INSPECTED THE AREA, CLOSED THE ENG AND RAN IT FOR APPROX 5 MINS DUE TO OIL INDICATION FOR THE LAYOVER MAINT ON THAT AIRPLANE. DUE TO POSITIONING AND NATURE OF MY REPAIR I MAY HAVE MISPLACED MY RAGS/CLOTH THAT I HAD WITH ME WHILE WORKING. THIS IS SOMETHING THAT WAS NOT EVIDENT TO ME ON MY FINAL INSPECTION AND CLOSE-UP OF THE ENG. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE RAG WAS LATER FOUND WITH THE REMOVED FIRE LOOP PART. THE RPTR SAID BY ALERTING EVERYONE AND INSPECTING #1 ENG AT A DOWNLINE STATION A MAINT DELAY OCCURRED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 451222: MAINT LATER CHKED THE ENG AND FOUND ASHES IN THE ENG THAT THEY BELIEVE WAS FROM SOME KIND OF FOREIGN OBJECT DAMAGE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR OF ACN 451222 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE FLT WAS ORIGINATED IN ZZZ IN THE MORNING AFTER A OVERNIGHT LAYOVER WHERE MAINT WORKED A CHRONIC #1 ENG FIRE WARNING LOOP 'B.' THE RPTR SAID THE #1 ENG HAD A CHRONIC HISTORY OF INTERMITTENT TEST AND FALSE WARNING. THE RPTR STATED THIS WAS NO FALSE WARNING AS WHEN THE COWLING WAS OPENED ASHES WERE FOUND IN THE COWLING UNDER THE HOT SECTION OF THE ENG.

Synopsis :

AN MD90 WAS DISPATCHED AFTER MAINT WITH SUSPICION THAT A WIPE RAG WAS LEFT IN THE ENG COWLING. ACFT INCURRED A #1 ENG FIRE ON TKOF AT THE FIRST DOWNLINE STATION.

Time

Date : 199910

Day : Fri

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : L18.Airport

State Reference : CA

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Component / 1

Aircraft Component : Intake Assembly

Aircraft Reference : X

Problem : Failed

Component / 2

Aircraft Component : Powerplant Mounting

Aircraft Reference : X

Problem : Failed

Person / 1

Function.Oversight : Supervisor

ASRS Report : 452097

Person / 2

Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 2

Resolatory Action.Other : Shutdown Engine

Consequence.Other : Flight Cancelled

Consequence.Other : Maintenance Action

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

MATERIAL DEFICIENCY. FAILED COMPONENT: INTAKE MANIFOLD BALANCE TUBE ASSEMBLY, TELEDYNE CONTINENTAL MOTORS PART NUMBER #630628. INSTALLED ON: RECIPROCATING ENG, TCM 0-470-U, 783.2 HRS TSMOH (INSTALLED JAN/XA/95). END ITEM: CESSNA C182Q (1979), 2463.5 HRS TTAF. BACKGROUND: AFTER ENG START PLT EXPERIENCED A 'ROUGH-RUNNING ENG' AND SHUT DOWN PRIOR TO TAXI. RPTR IS UNIT'S MAINT OFFICER, WHO ARRANGED TO HAVE THE ENG RUN FOR TROUBLESHOOTING BY A LICENSED AMT (AVIATION MAINT TECHNICIAN). AMT DUPLICATED THE MALFUNCTION AND DETERMINED THE #6 CYLINDER WAS NOT FIRING. VISUAL INSPECTION DISCOVERED THE INTAKE MANIFOLD BAL TUBE ASSEMBLY HAD CRACKED AND SEPARATED AT 1 OF ITS 2 WELDS. THE FAILED WELD WAS AT THE L FORWARD SIDE OF THE INTAKE MANIFOLD, IN IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF THE #6 CYLINDER INTAKE VALVE. (THE AMT DETERMINED THAT OUTSIDE AIR WAS BEING DRAWN INTO THIS CYLINDER, DILUTING THE FUEL-AIR MIXTURE TO THE POINT WHERE COMBUSTION WAS NOT POSSIBLE). CAUSE: THE BAL TUBE HAD SETTLED ONTO THE FORWARD LORD MOUNT INSTALLED ON THE LOWER ENG COWLING, CAUSING A RESISTANT FORCE TO BE APPLIED AT A SINGLE POINT AT THE MIDDLE OF THE BAL TUBE. (THE BAL TUBE HAD SETTLED BECAUSE THE ENTIRE ENG HAD SETTLED ON ITS MAIN MOTOR MOUNTS -- DUE TO COMPRESSION OF THE RUBBER IN THE MOUNTS. BUT THAT'S ANOTHER STORY.) DEFICIENCY: WITH THE FULL WT OF THE ENG BEARING ON THE BAL TUBE AT THIS SINGLE POINT (THE LORD MOUNT) THE STRESS WAS RELIEVED NOT BY THE TUBE BENDING AT ITS MIDPOINT BUT RATHER BY ONE OF ITS END WELDS FAILING. WHEN THIS BAL TUBE WAS REMOVED AND INSPECTED THE AMT REMARKED THAT THE BEAD OF THE FAILED WELD APPEARED LESS SUBSTANTIAL THAN THE OTHER BEAD. IT APPEARS THE FAILED WELD WAS THE WEAKEST POINT OF THIS PARTICULAR TUBE. SUSPECT THIS IS NOT HOW (AND WHERE) THIS COMPONENT WAS EXPECTED TO GIVE OUT.

Synopsis :

C182 HAD A ROUGH RUNNING ENG ON START UP.

ACN: 452813

Time

Date : 199909

Day : Tue

Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Component / 1

Aircraft Component : Indicating and Warning - Lighting Systems

Aircraft Reference : X

Problem : Improperly Operated

Person / 1

ASRS Report : 452813

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Documentation

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other : Maintenance Action

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

DURING A SCHEDULED LINE CHK, THE CAUTION LIGHT MODULES #8 AND #9 HAD UNREADABLE LEGENDS. THE MODULES WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH THE WRONG PART NUMBER MODULES, THUS CHANGING THE SEGMENT CONFIG. THE ACFT WAS MODIFIED WITH A RUDDER ISOLATION VALVE AND PART OF THE MODIFICATION IS TO CHANGE A 'FILTER' IN THE CAUTION PANEL MODULE AND INSCRIBE A NEW PART NUMBER ON THE SIDE OF THE MODULE, THE OLD NUMBER IS TO BE CROSSED OUT. WHEN I REMOVED THE DISCREPANT MODULES I USED THE PART NUMBER ON THE SIDE OF THE MODULE (WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN CROSSED OUT AND A NEW ONE INSTALLED). THIS FAILURE TO CHANGE THE NUMBER, AND MY NEGLECT IN CONSULTING THE IPC (ILLUSTRATED PARTS CATALOG) RESULTED IN THE WRONG MODULE BEING INSTALLED IN POS #8 AND #9. THE ACFT WAS RELEASED FOR PAX SVC AND FLEW FOR SEVERAL DAYS, UNTIL THE ACFT ENCOUNTERED A LOSS OF HYD PRESSURE ON THE #1 SYS. THIS RESULTED IN THE 'RUDDER ISOLATION VALVE' BEING ACTIVATED. THE CAUTION LIGHT WAS ILLUMINATED, AND INSTEAD OF THE 'RUDDER ISOLATION VALVE' CAUTION LIGHT BEING ILLUMINATED IT WAS A BLANK (ONLY A LIGHTED DASH IN THE SEGMENT).

Synopsis :

A DHC8-100 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH THE INCORRECT MASTER CAUTION ANNUNCIATOR PANEL INSTALLED CAUSED BY A SHOP PART NUMBER ERROR.

Time

Date : 199909

Day : Fri

Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Component / 1

Aircraft Component : Fuel System

Aircraft Reference : X

Person / 1

ASRS Report : 452818

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Documentation

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Non Compliance With MEL

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other : Maintenance Action

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

ON SEP/XA/99 I TROUBLESHOT A FUEL DUMP SYS IN REF TO THE TAXI MANUAL. I CHKED THE SYS UPON THE ACFT ARR AT ZZZ AND BOTH DUMP VALVE LIGHTS CAME ON. I THEN CLOSED THE SWITCH AND THEY BOTH WENT OUT. I PROCEEDED TO TROUBLESHOOT FURTHER AND REPLACED A RELAY. I SIGNED THE SYS OFF. I AM NOW BEING TOLD THAT UPON VISUAL INSPECTION OF THE ACFT WHILE IN 'C' CHK IN LOS ANGELES AFTER THE ACFT WAS OPENED UP, BOTH DUMP VALVE CONNECTORS WERE FOUND DISCONNECTED. WHEN I LEFT THE ACFT, THE SYS WAS OPERATIONAL. THE LOGBOOK NEVER STATED THAT THE PLUGS WERE REMOVED. THE PLUGS WERE REINSTALLED AND THE SYS OPS CHK'ED WE SHOULD BE STATING IN THE LOGBOOK THAT WE REMOVED PLUG AND/OR SAFETY VALVES OPEN OR CLOSED.

Synopsis :

A DC10-10 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH THE FUEL DUMP SYS INOP BUT A DEFERRED ITEM ON THE DUMP SYS SIGNED OFF AND CLRED AS SYS OPERATING NORMALLY.

ACN: 452918

Time

Date : 199910

Day : Fri

Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft / 1

Make Model : Gulfstream II

Component / 1

Aircraft Component : Drinkable/Waste Water Syst

Aircraft Reference : X

Person / 1

ASRS Report : 452918

Person / 2

Function.Observation : Air Carrier Inspector

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Consequence.FAA : Investigated

Consequence.Other : Maintenance Action

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas : FAA

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

FEB/MON/98, I SIGNED AN FAA FORM 337 WHICH AMENDED A PERVIOUS FAA 337, DATED JUL/TUE/73, WHICH CONVERTED A GRAVITY TYPE WATER SYS TO A PRESSURIZED SYS. THE AMENDED 337 WAS NEEDED TO REPAIR A FAULTY REGULATOR AND CHK VALVE, IN WHICH NEEDED TO BE REPLACED. THE PARTS HAD TO BE REPLACED, AND THE MANUFACTURER OF THESE PARTS WAS OUT OF BUSINESS. NEW PARTS WERE PROCURED FROM A WELL ESTABLISHED VENDOR WHO ROUTINELY INSTALLS WATER SYS ON THESE CALIBER OF ACFT THAT ARE PART OF AN STC (SUPPLEMENTAL TYPE CERTIFICATE) PACKAGE. THE PARTS REMOVED WERE NOT PMA/TSO (PARTS MANUFACTURER APPROVAL/TECHNICAL STANDARD ORDER) PARTS AND THE PARTS INSTALLED WERE NOT PMA/TSO EITHER BUT WERE USED IN CURRENT SYS. PARTS ALSO WERE SAME FORM FIT AND FUNCTION. I DEEMED THE SYS AS AIRWORTHY AND STILL CONSIDER IT AS SUCH. ON OCT/FRI/99, IT WAS BROUGHT TO MY ATTN, AN FAA AIRWORTHINESS INSPECTOR WOULD NOT GRANT THIS ACFT A 135 CERTIFICATE DUE TO THE FAA 337 NOT BEING FIELD APPROVED. I BELIEVE THIS IS TECHNICALLY CORRECT AS THE PARTS ARE NOT PMA/TSO, BUT CONSIDERING THE ENTIRE SYS WAS NOT INSTALLED WITHOUT A FIELD APPROVAL (IT WAS INSTALLED AND APPROVED BY AN AIRWORTHINESS INSPECTOR). A FIELD APPROVAL WAS NOT REQUIRED. I SHOULD HAVE SOUGHT A FIELD APPROVAL TECHNICALLY, BUT STILL BELIEVE IS NOT APPROPRIATE FOR THIS APPLICATION. THE 337 WAS USED AS A MEANS OF PROPERLY ALTERING THE ORIGINAL ALTERATION DUE TO LIKE PARTS BEING INSTALLED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE ACFT WAS SOLD AND THE WATER SYS APPROVAL AND FIELD INSPECTION PROBS WERE NEVER RESOLVED. THE RPTR SAID THE PARTS USED IN THE REPAIR WERE THE SAME PARTS USED WHEN THE WATER SYS WAS MODIFIED FROM GRAVITY TO PRESSURE FLOW WITH SUPPLEMENTAL TYPE CERTIFICATE PARTS AND APPROVED BY SUBMITTING A FORM 337. THE RPTR SAID WHEN WORKING WITH AGING ACFT THE PAPERWORK TRAIL IS MASSIVE.

Synopsis :

A GULFSTREAM 2 WAS DENIED A CERTIFICATE TO OPERATE IN PART 135 OP DUE TO FAA INSPECTOR REQUIREMENT FOR A FIELD INSPECTION OF A POTABLE WATER REPAIR.

Time

Date : 199910

Day : Mon

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Component / 1

Aircraft Component : Approach Coupler

Aircraft Reference : X

Problem : Malfunctioning

Person / 1

Function.Oversight : Supervisor

ASRS Report : 452991

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other : Maintenance Action

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

FAILED TO REMOVE AUTOPLT GS MODE FROM USE THROUGH MEL IN ADDITION TO THE DOWNGRADE OF LOW MINIMUM PERFORMANCE STATUS TO NOT CAT II AS A PROPER RESPONSE TO PIREP 13 LOG PAGE WXYZ REF 22-ID.

Synopsis :

A B727-200 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH THE AUTOPLT GS MODE DEFERRED AS INOP BUT ACFT NOT REMOVED FROM CAT II STATUS.

ACN: 453216

Time

Date : 199910

Day : Sat

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Component / 1

Aircraft Component : Generator Drive

Aircraft Reference : X

Problem : Failed

Person / 1

ASRS Report : 453216

Person / 3

Function.Oversight : Supervisor

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other : Maintenance Action

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

THE ACFT ARRIVED AT THE HANGAR FOR WHAT WE WERE TOLD A SHEARED GENERATOR SHAFT. THEY WERE HOLDING THE TRIP THIS AIRPLANE WAS TO GO ON AND AS SOON AS WE WERE DONE IT WOULD GO. WE REMOVED THE GENERATOR AND FOUND THE CONSTANT SPD DRIVE WAS THE PROB. WE THEN LOOKED AT THE LOGBOOK AND FOUND THE REAL PROB WAS A CONSTANT SPD DRIVE LOW OIL PRESSURE LIGHT CAME ON. AFTER WE HAD THE GENERATOR AND CONSTANT SPD DRIVE REMOVED, WE WERE TOLD BY OUR MGMNT THAT WE DID NOT HAVE A CONSTANT SPD DRIVE IN STOCK AND TO PUT EVERYTHING TOGETHER AND DEFER IT. THEN IT WAS DECIDED TO ROB A CONSTANT SPD DRIVE FROM A SPARE ENG. THE MAINT MANUAL STATES TO CHK THE CONSTANT SPD DRIVE FILTER. MY PARTNER AND I GOT SPLIT UP. I THOUGHT HE CHKED THE FILTER, HE THOUGHT I DID IT. THE OIL FILTER WAS NOT CHKED. 2 FLTS LATER THE FLC GOT A CONSTANT SPD DRIVE TEMP LIGHT GOING TO LAS. IN LAS IT WAS DISCOVERED THE OIL FILTER WAS FULL OF METAL. FACTORS AFFECTING THIS WAS MISINFO, WE WERE RUSHED, BEING SPLIT UP DUE TO ONE OF US HAVING TO GO ROB A PART AND MISMGMT.

Synopsis :

A B737-300 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH A CONSTANT SPD DRIVE AND GENERATOR REPLACEMENT THAT WAS NOT SVCABLE.

Time

Date : 199910

Day : Fri

Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft / 1

Make Model : B767-300

Component / 1

Aircraft Component : Filter

Aircraft Reference : X

Problem : Improperly Operated

Person / 1

ASRS Report : 453547

Person / 2

ASRS Report : 453542

Person / 4

ASRS Report : 453576

Person / 3

ASRS Report : 453568

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Documentation

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Unable

Consequence.Other : Aircraft Damaged

Consequence.Other : Maintenance Action

Situations

Aircraft.Make Model.Value : 148.72

Aircraft.Aircraft Component.Value : 29.12

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

ON OCT/XA/99, I WAS PULLED OFF LIVE FLT GATES TO TRY TO RETURN TO SVC A B767 THAT HAD A DISINTEGRATED L ENG HYD PUMP. I WAS TOLD TO GO HELP 2 OTHER TECHNICIANS FINISH UP TIGHTENING UP A FEW HOSES, FILTER HOUSINGS, AND THE ACTUAL PUMP. UPON ARR TO THE ACFT, THE TECHNICIANS WERE ALMOST DONE AND WAS DIRECTED TO THE COCKPIT TO GET READY FOR AN ENG RUN. I PROCEEDED TO MOTOR AND THEN RUN THE L ENG PER THE TAXI/START-UP CHKLST EXCEPT OMITTED TO CHK THE LOGBOOK. AT THE TIME, I FOUND IT NOT OF GREAT CONCERN BUT LATER FOUND OUT THAT THIS JOB WAS A PRIOR SHIFT TURNOVER. THE JOB WAS TURNED OVER TO 4 DIFFERENT PEOPLE BEFORE WE STARTED WORKING ON IT. PER THE MAINT MANUAL WE WERE TO CHK THE HYD FILTER FOR CONTAMINATION. UPON REMOVING THE HOUSING WE FOUND OUT THERE WERE NO FILTERS INSTALLED. NOBODY HAD SAID ANYTHING TO US. AFTER THE INCIDENT I LOOKED THROUGH THE LOGBOOK AND SAW AN ITEM THAT READ 'CASE DRAIN AND PRESSURE FILTERS REMOVED, HOUSING INSTALLED LOOSELY.' THIS IS A PERFECT EXAMPLE OF COM BREAKDOWN. ALTHOUGH THE ITEM WAS IN THE LOGBOOK, IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN REITERATED THAT THE FILTERS WERE NOT INSTALLED. ALL OF THE MECHS INVOLVED ARE OF GOOD MAINT JUDGEMENT. THIS INCIDENT IS JUST A NATURAL HUMAN ERROR.

Synopsis :

A B767-300 INCURRED HYD SYS DAMAGE WHEN THE L SYS WAS OPERATED TO TEST A REPLACEMENT ENG DRIVEN PUMP WITH NO FILTERS INSTALLED.

ACN: 453552

Time

Date : 199910

Day : Fri

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft / 1

Make Model : A319

Component / 1

Aircraft Component : Escape Slide

Aircraft Reference : X

Problem : Improperly Operated

Person / 1

ASRS Report : 453552

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other : Flight Cancelled

Consequence.Other : Maintenance Action

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

DURING INVESTIGATION OF VIBRATION IN AREA OF L-HAND OVERWING ESCAPE HATCH LOG WRITE-UP, THE LEAD MECH DECIDED TO CHK THE HATCH SEALS. WHEN I WAS REQUESTED TO OPEN THE HATCH, I FELL INTO A TRAP. ALTHOUGH I BELIEVED THIS ACFT HAD A SLIDE, DUE TO NOISE AND APCHING DEP TIME, I OPENED THE DOOR AS REQUESTED. THE SLIDE DEPLOYED AS DESIGNED. THIS RESULTED IN CANCELLATION OF THE TRIP. IF I HAD COMMUNICATED MY BELIEF THAT THE LEAD WAS INCORRECT IN HIS BELIEF THERE WAS NO SLIDE, AND BEEN MORE ASSERTIVE ABOUT CHKING, THIS INCIDENT COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED.

Synopsis :

AN AIRBUS 319, PRIOR TO DEP, TECHNICIANS TROUBLESHOOTING A VIBRATION IN THE AREA OF THE L WING ESCAPE INADVERTENTLY DEPLOYED THE SLIDE.

ACN: 453574

Time

Date : 199910

Day : Sat

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft / 1

Make Model : MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Component / 1

Aircraft Component : Autoland

Aircraft Reference : X

Person / 1

ASRS Report : 453574

Person / 2

Function.Oversight : Supervisor

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Documentation

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Non Compliance With MEL

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other : Maintenance Action

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

ON OCT/XA/99 I REPLACED A CENTRAL AURAL WARNING BOX AS PER MAINT CTL AS A PRECAUTIONARY ACTION TO A PROB THAT COULD NOT BE DUPLICATED, THEN PERFORMED A SATISFACTORY OPS CHK AND MADE 1 ENTRY IN LOGBOOK STATING SAME. AS PER MAINT PROCS MANUAL, I SHOULD HAVE MADE 2 ENTRIES AS WORDED IN THE MANUAL DUE TO COMPONENT BEING PART OF A CAT SYS. ON NOV/XB/99 WE INFORMED MAINT CTL OF THE SIT WITH THE LOGBOOK ENTRY. AT THIS POINT WE WERE ADVISED TO ENTER SECOND ENTRIES THAT WERE NEEDED, WHICH WE DID ACCOMPLISH. AS A MECH, SOME IDEAS THAT MIGHT HELP TO PREVENT THIS PROB FROM RECURRING WOULD BE SOME TRAINING ON CAT SYS OR PLACARDS TO IDENT COMPONENTS THAT ARE PART OF ANY CAT SYS.

Synopsis :

AN MD80 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH A UNIT REPLACED THAT AFFECTED THE LOWER WX MINIMUM STATUS OF THE ACFT. ACFT NOT TESTED OR STATUS PLACARDED.

ACN: 453998

Time

Date : 199910

Day : Sun

Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft / 1

Make Model : B737-500

Component / 1

Aircraft Component : Nacelle/Pylon Attachment

Aircraft Reference : X

Problem : Not Installed

Person / 1

ASRS Report : 453998

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other : Company Review

Consequence.Other : Maintenance Action

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

ACFT XYZ ARRIVED AT ZZZ OCT/XA/99 AROUND XA00 FOR OVERNIGHT MAINT. #2 ENG PYLON PANELS WERE REMOVED FOR INSPECTION. ABOUT XH00 ON OCT/XA/99 MAINT WAS COMPLETED IN PYLON AREA AND PANELS WERE REINSTALLED. THE PANELS WERE INSTALLED AND SECURED BY XH30. I SIGNED FOR THE INSTALLATION AND CALLED FOR INSPECTION. INSPECTION CHKED THE PYLON AND ALL THE PANELS FOR INSTALLATION AND SECURITY BY XH35 AND BROUGHT THE PANELS BACK IN THE SIGN OFF BOOK. ON OCT/XB/99 THE ACFT FLEW TO JACKSON, MS, AND THE PLT FOUND PANELS 5827R, 5828R, AND 5829R ON #2 PYLON MISSING ON HIS PREFLT WALKAROUND. THE INSPECTION PANELS WERE CDL'ED AND INSTALLED IN ACFT AFTER THE NEXT FLT.

Synopsis :

A B737-500 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH #2 ENG PYLON PANELS NOT SECURED WHICH DEPARTED THE ACFT INFLT.

Time

Date : 199911

Day : Wed

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft / 1

Make Model : A300

Person / 1

ASRS Report : 454495

Person / 2

ASRS Report : 454476

Person / 4

ASRS Report : 454494

Person / 5

ASRS Report : 454493

Person / 6

ASRS Report : 454491

Person / 7

ASRS Report : 454492

Person / 3

ASRS Report : 454496

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Documentation

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Consequence.Other : Maintenance Action

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

ON NOV/XA/99 I WAS INFORMED THAT I WAS NOT QUALIFIED TO SIGN THE WORK THAT I HAD BEEN ASSIGNED, PER THE MANUAL.

Synopsis :

AN AIRBUS 300 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE DUE TO WORK PERFORMED AND SIGNED OFF BY UNQUALIFIED TECHNICIANS.

ACN: 454697

Time

Date : 199911

Day : Tue

Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft / 1

Make Model : DC-9 30

Component / 1

Aircraft Component : APU Controls

Aircraft Reference : X

Person / 1

ASRS Report : 454697

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other : Maintenance Action

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

WHILE TROUBLESHOOTING THE APU ON A DC9 ACFT, I INADVERTENTLY INSTALLED THE WRONG PART EFFECTIVE FOR THAT ACFT DUE TO LCL PRACTICE OF USING QUICK REF BOOKS AND TIME CONSTRAINTS. I ASKED THE LEAD TO PULL A PART AND DIDN'T USE THE PARTS CATALOG TO VERIFY THE EXCITER BOX PART NUMBER. I REALIZED MY MISTAKE UPON FOLLOWING UP ON THE ACFT A COUPLE OF DAYS LATER. I CONTACTED OUR PLANNING DEPT TO OPEN AN ITEM TO HAVE THE PROPER PART INSTALLED.

Synopsis :

A DC9-30 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH THE INCORRECT APU IGNITION SYS EXCITER BOX INSTALLED.

ACN: 455455

Time

Date : 199911

Day : Mon

Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft / 1

Make Model : B757-200

Component / 1

Aircraft Component : Emergency Exit Lighting

Aircraft Reference : X

Problem : Malfunctioning

Person / 1

ASRS Report : 455455

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Documentation

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Non Compliance With MEL

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.FAA : Investigated

Consequence.Other : Maintenance Action

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

ON NOV/MON/99, I RECEIVED A CALL FROM ZZZ MAINT REQUESTING MEL FOR EMER LIGHT INOP. I VERIFIED THE MEL 33-51-1 AND DISCUSSED THE PROC. THE MECH VERIFIED ADJACENT LIGHTS WERE OPERATIVE AND A MEL WAS ISSUED. I VERIFIED THE MEL THROUGH OUR MASTER MEL BOOK. WE ALSO USE ANOTHER BOOK FOR ISSUING MEL'S CALLED THE MEL CTL BOOK. IN THIS BOOK MEL'S ARE BROKEN DOWN EVEN FURTHER TO AIDE IN MEL CTL. I DID VERIFY MEL BY MASTER MEL BOOK, BUT I MADE A MISTAKE WHEN I WENT TO THE MEL CTL BOOK. THE CODE 33-51-3-4 IS DESCRIBED AS ESCAPE PATH CLR MODULES. IN THE CTL BOOK IT DOES NOT SPECIFY FLOOR OR SEAT. THIS IS WHERE I MADE MY MISTAKE. THE LIGHT IN QUESTION WAS A CLR MODULE. ALTHOUGH THIS ITEM IN QUESTION WAS LEGAL AS FAR AS THE MEL, I DID MISTAKENLY ISSUE THE WRONG MEL ITEM NUMBER. THE ITEM WAS CLRED ON NOV/WED/99.

Synopsis :

A B757-200 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH AN EMER CABIN LIGHT DEFERRED AS INOP, BUT THE INCORRECT MEL ITEM NUMBER ENTERED IN THE LOGBOOK.

ACN: 455478

Time

Date : 199911

Day : Thu

Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft / 1

Make Model : B737-700

Component / 1

Aircraft Component : Service/Access Door

Aircraft Reference : X

Problem : Improperly Operated

Person / 1

Function.Oversight : Supervisor

ASRS Report : 455478

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Diverted To Another Airport

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.FAA : Assigned Or Threatened Penalties

Consequence.Other : Maintenance Action

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

ON NOV/THU/99, ACFT XYZ ARRIVED AT ZZZ MAINT FOR REGULAR OVERNIGHT SVC. A SVC CHK AND 2 DEFERRED ITEMS WERE SCHEDULED, PAX ADDRESS SYS AND ENTERTAINMENT SYS INOP. I PULLED THE CIRCUIT BREAKERS FOR THE PA AND ENTERTAINMENT SYS AND ENTERED THE E&E COMPARTMENT DOOR TO INSPECT THE COMPONENTS. I LEFT THE DOOR OPEN SO I COULD RETURN AND VERIFY THE INDICATOR LIGHT OP AFTER RESETTING THE CIRCUIT BREAKERS. AS I WAS LEAVING THE E&E COMPARTMENT I SAW THE ASSISTANT SUPVR AND UPDATED HIM. WE FOUND THE COCKPIT HAND MIKE INOP, R&R IT AND OPS CHKED PA SYS AT EACH FLT ATTENDANT LOCATION, ALL FUNCTIONS, AND ENTERTAINMENT SYS. ALL OPERATED NORMAL. I THEN PROCEEDED TO MAINT OFFICE TO COMPLETE THE PAPERWORK TO CLR THE DEFERRED ITEMS. THERE WAS NO NEED TO REENTER THE E&E COMPARTMENT AGAIN DUE TO ALL SYS OPERATIONAL CHKED NORMAL, THUS FORGETTING TO CLOSE THE ACCESS DOOR. THE ACFT DEPARTED ZZZ BOUND FOR HOUSTON, COULD NOT PRESSURIZE AND DIVERTED TO ABC FOR MAINT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE DOOR WAS LEFT OPEN AND NOT DISCOVERED BY THE GATE MECH OR THE SO ON THE WALKAROUND INSPECTIONS. THE RPTR SAID AFTER THE ACFT DIVERTED WITH AN 'UNABLE TO PRESSURIZE' RPT IT WAS FOUND THE DOOR WARNING SYS FOR THIS DOOR WAS INOP. THE RPTR STATED HE WAS INTERVIEWED BY THE FAA AND GIVEN A LETTER OR REPRIMAND.

Synopsis :

A B737-700 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH THE ELECTRONICS AND ELECTRICAL COMPARTMENT ACCESS DOOR OPEN. FLT DIVERTED WHERE MAINT FOUND DOOR OPEN AND DOOR WARNING SYS INOP.

ACN: 455481

Time

Date : 199911

Day : Thu

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft / 1

Make Model : B737-300

Person / 1

Function.Oversight : Coordinator

ASRS Report : 455481

Person / 2

Function.Oversight : Supervisor

Person / 3

Function.Other Personnel : Dispatcher

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Anomaly.Other Anomaly : Hazardous Material Violation

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other : Company Review

Consequence.Other : Maintenance Action

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

I WAS WORKING AS AN UPGRADE STATION MAINT CTLR, SMC, WHEN I RECEIVED A CALL FROM ONE OF OUR ACFT DISPATCHERS. THE DISPATCH PERSON TOLD ME A CAPT WAS REFUSING TO TAKE AN ACFT BECAUSE A BOOST PUMP LOW PRESSURE LIGHT WAS DEFERRED INOP, PUMP OP WAS NORMAL. I WAS INSTRUCTED BY DISPATCH TO TELL THE TECHNICIAN WORKING THE TRIP TO DEFER THE PUMP COMPLETELY INOP AND PUT A BOOST PUMP IN AN AREA WE REFER TO AS THE 'LOB, LEAVE ON BOARD.' DEFERRED ITEM WAS ALSO UPDATED BY SOMEONE IN ABC TO DO THE SAME, POSSIBLY A LINE MAINT CTLR. THE TECHNICIAN SPOKE WITH THE CAPT, AND BOTH MUST HAVE AGREED TO TAKING THE PLANE AS IS BECAUSE THE PUMP WAS NEVER DEFERRED INOP. THE PUMP WAS PUT ON THE PLANE WHEN IT RETURNED FROM ITS TRIP. TO PREVENT A DELAY OR TO JUST KEEP THE CAPT FROM NOT TAKING THE AIRPLANE, SOMEONE, DISPATCH, DECIDED TO HAVE US PUT A PUMP ONBOARD WITHOUT GIVING ANY THOUGHT AS TO IT BEING HAZMAT. THIS WAY IT COULD BE REPLACED LATER AT THE END OF FLYING THAT DAY. THE PUMP IS DELIVERED IN A SHIPPING CONTAINER WITH NO HAZMAT MARKINGS SO NOT BEING INVOLVED IN THE PACKING OR EVEN SHIPPING OF THINGS, TECHNICIANS WOULD NOT KNOW IF IT WAS PROPERLY PACKAGED FOR SHIPMENT. ONE OTHER WAS THAT AN FAA INSPECTOR WAS RIDING ALONG WHICH I FEEL IN SOME WAY MADE THE CAPT NERVOUS ABOUT HAVING SOMETHING WRONG WITH THE AIRPLANE. HAD THE INSPECTOR NOT BEEN THERE IT IS POSSIBLE NOTHING WOULD HAVE EVER BEEN SAID ABOUT THE PUMP LOW PRESSURE LIGHT BEING INOP. WHAT I KNOW ABOUT HOW IT WAS DISCOVERED AND EVEN WHAT CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN IS LIMITED. AFTER THE PUMP WAS CHANGED LATE THAT NIGHT, WITH A DIFFERENT PUMP, IT WAS DISCOVERED IN THE LOB AREA. ANY CORRECTIVE ACTIONS WOULD BE THE BETTER MARKING OF HAZMAT ITEMS LIKE FUEL OR HYD COMPONENTS SO EVERYONE INCLUDING THE PEOPLE WHO LOAD THEM ARE SURE OF WHAT IS GOING ON THE AIRPLANE. THE ACFT DID MAKE AT LEAST 5 TRIPS WITH A FUEL PUMP ONBOARD AND I AM NOT SURE IF IT WAS PACKAGED PROPERLY OR NOT.

Synopsis :

A B737-300 WAS DISPATCHED AND OPERATED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH A SPARE FUEL TANK BOOST PUMP CARRIED IN THE CARGO PIT OVERNIGHT PARTS BIN. A HAZMAT VIOLATION.

Time

Date : 199911

Day : Fri

Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft / 1

Make Model : MD-88

Component / 1

Aircraft Component : Trailing Edge Flap Control

Aircraft Reference : X

Person / 1

ASRS Report : 455492

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other : Company Review

Consequence.Other : Maintenance Action

Situations

Aircraft.Make Model.Value : 583.46

Aircraft.Aircraft Component.Value : 27.5

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

WHILE I WAS WORKING A DEFERRED ITEM FOR EXCESSIVE FLAP DROOP ON AN MD88, I FOUND IT NECESSARY PER THE MAINT MANUAL TROUBLESHOOTING GUIDE TO REPLACE THE L AND R INBOARD TRAILING EDGE FLAP ACTUATING CYLINDERS. AFTER REPLACING THE CYLINDERS PER THE MAINT MANUAL, I ASKED ANOTHER MECH TO OVERLOOK MY WORK AND HELP ME FINISH THE INSTALLATION BY OPERATING THE FLAPS WHILE I CHKD FOR LEAKS AND PROPER OP AS PER THE MAINT MANUAL. BOTH CYLINDERS CHKD GOOD. I RECHKD THE MAINT MANUAL AND AT THAT TIME FOUND NO EVIDENCE THE CYLINDERS WERE REQUIRED INSPECTION ITEMS (RII), SO I SIGNED THE CYLINDERS OFF IN THE ACFT LOG. I WAS WORKING SEVERAL DAYS LATER WHEN I NOTICED A POSTER LISTING WHAT ITEMS ARE RII. HAVING NOTICED THAT FLT CTLs, AND IN PARTICULAR PRIMARY CTL ACTUATORS ARE RII, I REALIZED AN INSPECTOR NEEDED TO CHK THE INSTALLATION OF THE CYLINDERS. WE DO NOT REPLACE RII ITEMS OFTEN IN OUR DAY TO DAY WORK, AND IT IS HARD TO KEEP UP WITH THE RII LIST. THE LIST IS POSTED IN OUR WORK AREAS, BUT IT IS ALONG WITH SEVERAL OTHER POSTERS OF THE SAME SIZE AND COLOR. I BELIEVE RECURRENT TRAINING OR MARKING THE MAINT MANUAL WITH AN RII LOGO WOULD GREATLY INCREASE THE AWARENESS OF WHAT ITEMS ARE RII. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE JOB WAS WORKED USING THE MAINT MANUAL PROC AND HAD NO INDICATION OR STATEMENT THAT A REQUIRED INSPECTION WAS NEEDED AFTER COMPLETION. THE RPTR SAID THE ROUTINE JOB CARDS ARE IN THE SAME SIT WHERE NO INDICATION IS NOTED. THE RPTR STATED THE CARRIER SELF DISCLOSED THAT IN THE PAST MONTHS 200 ACFT WERE NOT INSPECTED AND RE-INSPECTION WAS REQUIRED. THE RPTR STATED IN LIGHT OF THE RECENT DISCLOSURE AND THE NUMBER OF ACFT INVOLVED THE MAINT MANUAL PAPERWORK AND JOB CARDS MUST BE REVISED.

Synopsis :

AN MD88 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH PRIMARY FLT CTL UNITS REPLACED WITHOUT THE REQUIRED INSPECTION ACCOMPLISHED.

ACN: 455651

Time

Date : 199911

Day : Thu

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft / 1

Make Model : B777-

Component / 1

Aircraft Component : AC Generation

Aircraft Reference : X

Problem : Design Deficiency

Person / 1

ASRS Report : 455651

Person / 2

Function.Oversight : Supervisor

ASRS Report : 455659

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other : Company Review

Consequence.Other : Maintenance Action

Situations

Aircraft.Make Model.Value : 148.81

Aircraft.Aircraft Component.Value : 24.2

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

COMPONENT CHK XXXX BACKUP GENERATOR OIL LEVEL AND OIL FILTER CHK REVISION DATE NOV/THU/99. I WAS AN ASSIGNED MECH TO ACCOMPLISH THIS COMPONENT CHK. I CHKED THE CTR DISPLAY CTL PANEL AND IT DISPLAYED THAT THE R BACKUP GENERATOR OIL LEVEL REQUIRED SVCING. I OPENED THE R FAN COVER ON ACFT XYZ AND PROCEEDED TO SVC THE R BACKUP GENERATOR IN ACCORDANCE WITH COMPONENT CHK XXXX. I MISUNDERSTOOD THE COMPONENT CHK AND HAD REALIZED I HAD PERFORMED THE COMPONENT CHK INCORRECTLY. THE WAY THAT THE COMPONENT CHK IS WRITTEN, I SHOULD HAVE OPENED BOTH ENG FAN COWLS, AND PHYSICALLY INSPECTED THE CONDITION OF THE BACKUP GENERATORS AND THE COWLS NEED TO REMAIN OPEN UNTIL A CREW CHIEF OR INSPECTOR INSPECTS THE GENERATORS. IT IS MY OPINION THAT THE FAN COWLS SHOULD ONLY BE OPENED WHEN A BACKUP GENERATOR REQUIRES SVCING. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE COMPONENT CHK IS A CHK OF THE BACKUP GENERATOR SYS ON THE B777 DUE TO INPUT SHAFT FAILURE. THE RPTR STATED THE CHK IS ACCOMPLISHED PRIOR TO DEP OF EVERY EXTENDED RANGE OP TO DETECT A SHEARED INPUT SHAFT ON THE VARIABLE SPD CONSTANT FREQ BACKUP GENERATORS WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO SHAFT BENDING, WOBBLING AND SEAL LEAKAGE. THE RPTR SAID THE CHK STARTS WITH USING THE EICAS DISPLAY ON THE MAINT PAGE FORMAT CHAPTER 24 WHICH DISPLAYS NUMEROUS ELECTRICAL INDICATIONS AS OIL TEMP, OIL LEVEL STATUS AND OIL FILTER STATUS. THE RPTR SAID THE ENG COWLING IS THEN OPENED AND A VISUAL CHK OF THE UNIT IS ACCOMPLISHED LOOKING AT OIL SIGHT LEVELS, CHKING FOR OBVIOUS LEAKS. THE RPTR STATED THE INPUT SHAFT IS NOT VISIBLE BUT A GOOD CLUE TO FAILURE WOULD BE LACK OF OIL AND SIGNS OF LEAKAGE OR DISCOLORED OIL AND/OR A CLOGGED OIL FILTER. THE RPTR SAID A FAILED SHAFT CANNOT BE DETECTED USING THE EICAS MAINT PAGE FORMAT AND A VISUAL CHK IS REQUIRED. THE RPTR STATED THE SPECIAL ITEM CHK JOB CARD WAS CONFUSING BECAUSE THE CARD HAD A SIGNOFF BLOCK FOR THE CREW CHIEF OR INSPECTOR AND IT WAS THOUGHT THIS BLOCK REQUIRED VISUAL INSPECTION BY THE CREW CHIEF OR INSPECTOR. THE RPTR SAID ENGINEERING CORRECTED THIS CARD SIGNOFF BLOCK TO INDICATE THE CREW CHIEF OR INSPECTOR ASSURED THE CHK PAPERWORK WAS CORRECT AND NO VISUAL INSPECTION IS REQUIRED. THE RPTR STATED THE ACFT IS PWRED WITH 2 ROLLS ROYCE TRENT 840 ENGS. THE RPTR SAID SOME IMPROVED SHAFTS HAVE BEEN INSTALLED BUT THE NUMBER IS UNKNOWN AND ALSO SEAL PROBS STILL EXIST.

Synopsis :

A B777-200 BEFORE EACH EXTENDED RANGE OP DEP, A COMPONENT CHK MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED TO THE BACKUP GENERATORS L AND R BUT THE JOB CARD CREATED CONFUSION ON INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS.

ACN: 455759

Time

Date : 199911

Day : Thu

Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft / 1

Make Model : B727-200

Component / 1

Aircraft Component : Nose Gear Tire

Aircraft Reference : X

Problem : Not Installed

Person / 1

ASRS Report : 455759

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other : Maintenance Action

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

ON NOV/XA/99, ACFT XYZ NEEDED BOTH L AND R NOSE TIRES REPLACED. MYSELF AND MECH #WXXX WERE ASSIGNED THE TASK. WORK WAS STARTED AT XA00 UPON CHANGING BOTH TIRES. WE WERE WORKING AS A CREW. AT THE POINT OF ALMOST COMPLETING THE JOB, THE ONLY THING LEFT WAS TO INSTALL THE L AND R NOSE TIRE HUB CAPS. I HAD TOLD WXXX THAT I HAD 'FINGER-TIGHTENED' THE R NOSE CAP BOLTS -- IF HE WOULD TIGHTEN THEM UP THE REST OF THE WAY WITH HIS SOCKET AND WRENCH AS I DID NOT HAVE A 9/16 INCH SOCKET AT MY DISPOSAL. I TOLD HIM IF HE DID THIS THEN I WOULD PICK UP THE TIRES AND TOOLS FOR CLEAN-UP BECAUSE THE CREW WAS COMING TO GET THE ACFT. WE THEN WERE AT THE POINT OF SIGNING THE WORK OFF. WE HAD BOTH SIGNED FOR THE L NOSE TIRE, BUT UPON FILLING OUT THE STATEMENT FOR THE R NOSE, WXXX HAD LEFT THE ROOM TO CLEAN UP AND AS I DID NOT HAVE HIS FILE NUMBER, I THEN SIGNED OFF THE NOSE TIRE MYSELF. THE ACFT WAS THEN RELEASED. I HAD ASSUMED DURING THE WORK TASK THAT ALL WORK WAS COMPLETED PER ACR REF MAINT MANUAL 32. I DID NOT KNOW THAT THERE WAS A MISCOM ABOUT TIGHTENING UP BOTH NOSE TIRE HUB CAPS. THE NEXT DAY, I WAS NOTIFIED THROUGH COMPANY E-MAIL ABOUT THE LOOSE R NOSE TIRE HUB CAP FROM MECH ABC DEX.

Synopsis :

A B727-200 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH THE R NOSE GEAR TIRE AND WHEEL ASSEMBLY HUB CAP NOT INSTALLED CORRECTLY.

ACN: 455801

Time

Date : 199911

Day : Tue

Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft / 1

Make Model : DC-10 10

Component / 1

Aircraft Component : Service/Access Door

Aircraft Reference : X

Problem : Improperly Operated

Person / 1

ASRS Report : 455801

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem

Consequence.Other : Company Review

Consequence.Other : Maintenance Action

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

ACR ACFT XYZ DEPARTED ZZZ WITH THE CTR ACCESSORY COMPARTMENT DOOR LEFT OPEN BY MISTAKE. AFTER THE DEP CALL BACK BY THE CREW, THE CAPT ELECTED TO CONTINUE ON TO ABC AT A REDUCED FLT ALT DUE TO ACFT PRESSURIZATION PROBS ASSOCIATED WITH THE DOOR. 1) THE CTR ACCESSORY DOOR BEING UNNOTICED AS 'OPEN' BY THE CREW WAS TRACED TO A BROKEN GND TERMINAL ON THE DOOR WARNING SWITCH. 2) THE INABILITY TO CONTACT THE AIRPLANE TO REQUEST A RETURN TO GATE BY VHF RADIO BY THE RAMP OPS FOLKS IS A MATTER BEING ADDRESSED BY MGMNT AS THIS IS WRITTEN. 3) THIS AIRPLANE, AND ITS OTHER ACR SISTER SHIPS, HAS BEEN IN SVC ONLY A VERY SHORT TIME PERIOD AND THE 'WEIRD' ITEMS ARE APPEARING AND DISAPPEARING ACROSS THE ENTIRE MAINT SYS WITH THESE AIRPLANES. THE CONTINUING AND SEEMINGLY INTERRELATED MAINT PROBS WITH AIRPLANE XYZ HAS BEEN BROUGHT TO MAINT MGMNT'S ATTN. A BRIEF MAINT REVIEW SHOWS STABILIZER TRIM WARNING, CAC DOOR WARNING, CARGO DOOR CTL PWR, CREW OXYGEN INDICATION, LAVATORY FLUSH MOTOR CTL, AND CSD INDICATION PROBS APPEAR INTERRELATED AND ARE DIRECTLY AFFECTED BY SVC BULLETIN SB XXW CORRECT COMPLIANCE (OR) B1-339 RCCB INTERMITTENT OP. A MAINT PLANNING MEETING HAS BEEN PENDING ON THIS AIRPLANE TO 'VERIFY' SVC BULLETIN COMPLIANCE SINCE NOV/XA/99. THE CONCEPT OF A DOOR LEFT OPEN FOR FLT IS ABHORRENT, BUT THE SYS TO GUARD AGAINST THIS POSSIBILITY WAS NOT WORKING.

Synopsis :

A DC10-10 IMMEDIATELY AFTER TKOF RPTED BEING UNABLE TO PRESSURIZE THE CABIN CAUSED BY A CTR ACCESSORY COMPARTMENT DOOR OPEN. FLT CONTINUED AT LOW ALT.

ACN: 455868

Time

Date : 199911

Day : Mon

Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft / 1

Make Model : A320

Component / 1

Aircraft Component : Fuselage Skin

Aircraft Reference : X

Person / 1

ASRS Report : 455868

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Consequence.Other : Maintenance Action

Situations

Aircraft.Make Model.Value : 04A.30

Aircraft.Aircraft Component.Value : 53.2

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication

Narrative :

THE DOUBLER THAT WAS MANUFACTURED WAS THE SECOND DOUBLER OF ITS KIND. THE FIRST DOUBLER WAS SCRAPPED. THAT WAS THE ONE I MANUFACTURED, ANOTHER MECH MANUFACTURED THE SECOND DOUBLER AND BACK DRILLED HOLES. DUE TO THE AREA AND CONTOUR OF 2 DIFFERENT SKINS BUTTED TOGETHER BY MANUFACTURER, CORRECT ROLL FOR CONTOUR ON THE DOUBLER WAS DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN, CORNERS OF DOUBLER WHEN IN THE INSTALLATION STAGE WOULD NOT LAY FLAT ON EXISTING SKINS, THEREFORE LARGE WASHERS ON ENDS OF CLECOS WERE USED TO BRING THE DOUBLER AGAINST THE ACFT SKIN. STILL COULD NOT BE OBTAINED, THE DOUBLER WAS THEN REMOVED BY ME AND ANOTHER MECH. WE THEN RE-ROLLED THE DOUBLER TO GAIN BETTER FIT AND CONTOUR. ANOTHER SHIFT STARTED INSTALLING THE NECESSARY FASTENERS AND WHEN I RETURNED ON MY SHIFT I WAS GIVEN THE TASK OF FINISHING THE REPAIR. THE AFT CORNER OF DOUBLER STILL WOULD NOT LAY FLAT. I THEN USED WASHERS UNDER CLECOS TO DRAW OUTER EDGE DOWN, IN WHICH AT THIS TIME BECAME SUCCESSFUL. I THEN REPLACED NUMEROUS AMOUNTS OF POORLY INSTALLED RIVETS THROUGH DOUBLER. THE FASTENERS THAT WERE INSTALLED WERE DRIVEN TOO FAR, CAUSING A LARGE BUCKTAIL AND LEAVING A RING-LIKE MARK UNDER BUCKTAIL. I REINSTALLED RIVETS, NEW ONES, KEEPING BUCKTAILS UNIFORM. ALSO DURING THIS TIME, I REPLACED SEVERAL HIGH LOCKS WHICH THE HEADS WERE PROTRUDING OUT OF FACE OF DOUBLER TOO FAR. RE-COUNTER SUNK HOLES AND REINSTALLED HIGH LOCKS. THE LENGTHS OF GRIP ON SEVERAL OTHER HIGH LOCKS WERE ALSO INCORRECT, THUS I REPLACED WITH CORRECT SIZE ALSO. I FEEL THE PROB HAD BEEN ENLARGED DUE TO TOO MANY SHIFTS AND MECHS TRYING TO COMPLETE THE TASK. ALSO, THE BIGGEST FACTOR IS THE TYPE OF REPAIR ITSELF, THE AIRBUS STRUCTURAL REPAIR MANUAL GIVES 2 SEPARATE REPAIRS ON THE SAME SHEET THUS CONFUSING THE MECHS. THE REPAIR OFFERS NO ASSISTANCE FOR A DOUBLER THAT DOES NOT MEET THE PROPER CONTOUR OF THE ACFT DUE TO THE MANUFACTURER'S ASSEMBLY OF ACFT SKINS THAT ARE BUTTED TOGETHER AND HAVE DIFFERENT COMPOUND CURVES TO MANY REPAIRS ON SAME PAGE OF STRUCTURAL REPAIR MANUAL.

Synopsis :

AN AIRBUS 320 EXPERIENCING A SHEET METAL DOUBLER REPAIR TO THE FUSELAGE SKIN INVOLVING COMPOUND CURVES HAS CONFLICTING AND CONFUSING TYPICAL REPAIRS IN THE STRUCTURAL REPAIR MANUAL.

ACN: 455953

Time

Date : 199911

Day : Mon

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft / 1

Make Model : Cessna Twin Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

Component / 1

Aircraft Component : Engine Indications

Aircraft Reference : X

Problem : Improperly Operated

Person / 1

ASRS Report : 455953

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Unable

Consequence.FAA : Investigated

Consequence.Other : Maintenance Action

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

I MISTAKENLY USED ACFT INSTRUMENTATION FOR THE START-UP AND BREAK-IN OF OVERHAULED ACFT ENGS. THE ACFT ENGS WERE OVERHAULED, BUT THE GAUGES WERE NOT CALIBRATED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THAT SEVERAL CESSNA LIGHT TWIN ACFT WITH NEWLY OVERHAULED ENGS WERE STARTED AND RUN FOR BREAK-IN WITHOUT THE ACFT ENG INSTS BEING CALIBRATED. THE RPTR SAID IT WAS A MANUFACTURER'S REQUIREMENT THAT THE ACFT ENG INSTS BE CALIBRATED BEFORE ENG START. THE RPTR STATED THE FAA HAS CONTACTED THE RPTR.

Synopsis :

SEVERAL CESSNA TWIN PISTON ACFT WITH OVERHAULED ENGS WERE STARTED AND RUN FOR BREAK-IN WITH UNCALIBRATED ACFT INSTRUMENTATION.

ACN: 455962

Time

Date : 199911

Day : Wed

Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft / 1

Make Model : MD-11

Component / 1

Aircraft Component : Fan Reverser

Aircraft Reference : X

Problem : Malfunctioning

Person / 1

ASRS Report : 455962

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Non Compliance With MEL

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

Consequence.Other : Maintenance Action

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

ON NOV/XA/99 I (ABC DEF) CAUGHT ACFT XYZ (AN MD11) FOR ACR. I AM A SENIOR MECH FOR ACR. MY GATE PARTNER WX WXXX AND I PARKED THE ACFT. I DID A WALKAROUND ON THE L SIDE AND MY PARTNER ON THE R. EVERYTHING WAS OK. I ASKED THE PLT HOW THE AIRPLANE WAS AND HE SAID GOOD. WHILE THE FLC WAS DOING THEIR WALKAROUND, I WAS NOTIFIED THAT THE #1 INBOARD SIDE OF THE THRUST REVERSER WAS NOT STOWED. WHEN I ARRIVED AT THE ACFT THE INBOARD SIDE WAS NOT STOWED. THERE WAS A 3/4 INCH GAP. MY GATE PARTNER AND I OPERATED THE THRUST REVERSER -- IT OPERATED CORRECTLY. AT THAT TIME I NOTICED AT THE 9 O'CLOCK POS ON THE INBOARD SIDE OF THE THRUST REVERSER LOOKING AFT, THE LOCKOUT BRACKET WAS MISSING. INSPECTED THE THRUST REVERSER AND DID NOT FIND THE MISSING BRACKET. THE PLT ALSO INFORMED ME THAT THERE WAS A #1 THRUST REVERSER UNLOCK LIGHT ILLUMINATED WHICH WAS NOT ILLUMINATED AT BLOCK-IN. AT THIS TIME I DEFERRED THE #1 THRUST REVERSER PER MEL XX-Y WHICH CONSISTS OF LOCKING THE THRUST REVERSER OUT. I INSTALLED 2 EACH LOCK PLATES ON THE INBOARD AND OUTBOARD GEAR BOXES OF THE THRUST REVERSER. I ALSO INSTALLED 5 OF THE 6 LOCKOUT PLATES ON THE #1 THRUST REVERSER TRANSLATING COWL. I COULD NOT INSTALL THE ONE AT THE 9 O'CLOCK POS DUE TO THE LOCKOUT BRACKET MISSING. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR WAS CONCERNED ABOUT DEVIATING FROM THE MEL SPECIAL PROCS BY USING ONLY 5 LOCKOUT BOLTS. THE RPTR SAID MAINT CTL WAS ADVISED AND THE DEFERRAL WAS APPROVED.

Synopsis :

AN MD11 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH #1 ENG THRUST REVERSER RENDERED INOP PER THE MEL BUT WAS MISSING 1 OF 6 LOCKOUT BOLTS.

ACN: 456229

Time

Date : 199910

Day : Sun

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft / 1

Make Model : B737-300

Component / 1

Aircraft Component : Nacelle/Pylon Skin

Aircraft Reference : X

Problem : Not Installed

Person / 1

ASRS Report : 456229

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other : Aircraft Damaged

Consequence.Other : Maintenance Action

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

I, ABC WXXX AIRFRAME AND PWRPLANT TECHNICIAN #WWXXZZ, EMPLOYED AT ACR AS A&P TECHNICIAN, WAS WORKING ON OCT/SUN/99 AS AN INSPECTOR, INSPECTING BOTH ENGS ON B737-300 ACFT XYZ. AS WE FINISHED ALL ROUTINE AND NON ROUTINE TASKS, ACFT WAS RETURNED TO SVC ON THE MORNING OF OCT/MON/99. AS IT LEFT ZZZ ARPT, SOMETIME DURING FLT 3 EACH SMALL ACCESS PANELS DEPARTED FROM #2 ENG PYLON FOR UNKNOWN REASONS. I HAD DONE MY INSPECTION PRIOR TO ACFT BEING RETURNED TO SVC AND VERIFIED ALL ACCESS PANELS TO BE INSTALLED AND BEING PRESENT. AT THAT TIME ACFT WAS TURNED OVER TO ONCOMING INSPECTOR AT XA30 WHERE ENG #1 AND #2 VIBRATION SURVEY WAS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLIED WITH. ACFT THEN RETURNED TO HANGAR, THEN FINAL WALKAROUND WAS ACCOMPLISHED AND VERIFIED ALL ACCESS AND SVC PANELS TO BE SECURED. ACFT THEN WAS OPERATED ON ACR FLT XZX FROM ZZZ ARPT TO VVV, US. AFTER ARRIVING AT VVV, FLC RPTED THAT 3 ACCESS PANELS (4827R, 5828R, AND 5829R) ON TOP OF R ENG PYLON WERE MISSING. SINCE ACCESS PANELS WERE SECONDARY STRUCTURE THEY WERE PUT ON CDL PER ACR POLICIES AND ACFT CONTINUED IN SVC AND ALL 3 PANELS WERE REPLACED LATER ON. NO DAMAGE HAD OCCURRED DUE TO THIS INCIDENT.

Synopsis :

A B737-300 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH THE R ENG PYLON UPPER SURFACE ACCESS PLATES NOT SECURED.

ACN: 456721

Time

Date : 199912

Day : Sat

Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft / 1

Make Model : B727-200

Component / 1

Aircraft Component : Leading Edge Slat

Aircraft Reference : X

Problem : Malfunctioning

Person / 1

ASRS Report : 456721

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Documentation

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other : Maintenance Action

Situations

Aircraft.Make Model.Value : 148.32

Aircraft.Aircraft Component.Value : 57.42

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

ON DEC/XA/99 I REPLACED A NUMBER 7 SLAT ACTUATOR ON ACFT XYZ FOR PRECAUTIONARY DUE TO AN INDICATION PROB WITH PREVIOUS HISTORY. I RETURNED THE ACFT TO SVC BUT DID NOT OBTAIN A REQUIRED INSPECTION ITEM FOR THE ACTUATOR REPLACEMENT. FOR MANY YEARS A REQUIRED INSPECTION ITEM WAS NOT REQUIRED AND IT COMPLETELY SLIPPED MY MIND. IF THE MAINT MANUAL WAS HIGHLIGHTED STATING THAT A REQUIRED INSPECTION ITEM IS REQUIRED FOR THE PART BEING REPLACED, THIS MAY NOT BE OVERLOOKED IN THE FUTURE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE LEADING EDGE SLAT ACTUATOR WAS REPLACED USING THE PROC IN THE MAINT MANUAL. THE RPTR SAID THE MAINT MANUAL MADE NO REF TO THE ACTUATOR REPLACEMENT REQUIRED INSPECTION. THE RPTR SAID A JOB CARD FOR THE ACTUATOR CHANGE USED MAINLY IN OVERHAUL AND HVY CHECKS DOES HAVE AN INSPECTOR SIGN OFF. THE RPTR STATED THE JOB CARDS ARE GENERALLY NOT USED IN THE TERMINAL WORK AREA. THE RPTR SAID THE TECHNICIAN ASSISTING IN THE ACTUATOR REPLACEMENT ALSO MISSED THE INSPECTION REQUIREMENT.

Synopsis :

A B727-200 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH A LEADING EDGE SLAT ACTUATOR REPLACED WITH NO REQUIRED INSPECTION ACCOMPLISHED.

ACN: 457000

Time

Date : 199912

Day : Tue

Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft / 1

Make Model : B767-300

Component / 1

Aircraft Component : Oil Line

Aircraft Reference : X

Person / 1

ASRS Report : 457000

Person / 3

Function.Oversight : Supervisor

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Documentation

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other : Maintenance Action

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

I AM AN A&P MECH FOR A MAJOR INTL AIRLINE. ON DEC/XB/99 ANOTHER MECH AND I WERE ASSIGNED 2 TASKS ON A B767-300ER. PER OUR COMPANY'S POLICIES AND PROCS MANUAL, ONLY THOSE PEOPLE DESIGNATED AS 'ETOPS QUALIFIED' MAY SIGN OFF TASKS OR DISCREPANCIES ON MOST SYS ON THE ACFT. A NON ETOPS QUALIFIED MECH MAY WORK UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF AN ETOPS QUALIFIED MECH AND THE ETOPS QUALIFIED MECH MAY SIGN OFF THE NON QUALIFIED MECH'S WORK. I AM NOT ETOPS QUALIFIED, WHILE THE OTHER MECH IS. WE HAD PRETTY MUCH WRAPPED UP THE FIRST TASK AND AS HE WAS CLEANING UP I BEGAN THE SECOND TASK, WHICH WAS TO REPLACE A #4 BEARING TUBE ASSEMBLY ON A PW4060 SERIES ENG. THE TUBE HAD BEEN FOUND DENTED ON A PREVIOUS INSPECTION ON DEC/XA/99 (NOT BY US). THE OTHER MECH JOINED ME NOT LONG AFTER I STARTED TO REMOVE AND REPLACE THE TUBE, AND IN FACT ASSISTED ME WITH THE INSTALLATION. WE COMPLETED THE REPLACEMENT PER THE MAINT MANUAL AND LEAK CHKED THE LINE, WHICH WAS FOUND TO BE OK FOR SVC. LATER IN THE SHIFT THE OTHER MECH MADE ALL THE REQUIRED LOGBOOK ENTRIES FOR THE ITEMS WE HAD WORKED, EXCEPT FOR THE ENTRY FOR THE TUBE REPLACEMENT. HE HANDED THE LOGBOOK TO ME SO I COULD ENTER AND CLR THE ITEM, WHICH I DID. A FEW DAYS LATER, I RECEIVED A MEMO AND COPY OF THE LOG PAGE FROM MY FOREMAN INDICATING THE TUBE REPLACEMENT PROC 'COULD' BE AN ETOPS ITEM AND I MAY HAVE NOT BEEN IN COMPLIANCE WITH OUR POLICIES AND PROCS REGARDING ETOPS ONLY TASKS. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION, WE LOOKED IN THE PROCS MANUAL EXACTLY WHAT TASKS WERE, OR WERE NOT, ETOPS ITEMS. AS IT TURNS OUT, ANY MAINT DONE ON THE ENGS (ALL ATA CHAPTERS) IS CONSIDERED AN ETOPS ITEM, SO I WAS MOST DEFINITELY NOT IN COMPLIANCE BY MAKING THE ENTRY FOR THE REPAIR IN THE LOGBOOK. THE MAINT PERFORMED WAS OK, AND I WAS BEING SUPERVISED BY AN ETOPS QUALIFIED MECH. THE SIGNOFF WAS THE PROB.

Synopsis :

A B767-300ER WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH AN ENG RPT SIGNED OFF BY AN UNQUALIFIED TECHNICIAN.

ACN: 457810

Time

Date : 199912

Day : Fri

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft / 1

Make Model : B737-200

Component / 1

Aircraft Component : Throttle/Power Level

Aircraft Reference : X

Problem : Malfunctioning

Person / 1

ASRS Report : 457810

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Landed In Emergency Condition

Consequence.Other : Maintenance Action

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

ON DEC/FRI/99 ACR SHIP XYZ ON FLT XXX DECLARED AN EMER ON APCH TO ZZZ. THE EMER WAS DECLARED DUE TO A JAMMED R ENG THROTTLE. ACR MAINT IN ZZZ FOUND THE R ENG AUTOTHROTTLE LVDT LOWER ATTACH BOLT HAD BECOME LOOSE, THUS BINDING THE THROTTLE LEVER. ON DEC/THU/99 I WORKED THIS ACFT WITH 3 OTHER MECHS. THE R ENG THROTTLE XOVER SHAFT WAS REPLACED DUE TO STIFF THROTTLE. THE AUTOTHROTTLE LVDT IS ATTACHED TO THE XOVER SHAFT. I FEEL THE CLOSE UP INSPECTION MAY HAVE OVERLOOKED THE SECURITY OF THIS BOLT.

Synopsis :

A B737-200 ON APCH DECLARED AN EMER DUE TO A JAMMED #2 THROTTLE CAUSED BY THE AUTOTHROTTLE TRANSDUCER ATTACH BOLT LOOSE BLOCKING THE THROTTLE LEVER.

ACN: 460994

Time

Date : 200001

Day : Mon

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft / 1

Make Model : A300

Component / 1

Aircraft Component : Cargo/Baggage

Aircraft Reference : X

Person / 1

ASRS Report : 460994

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other : Company Review

Consequence.Other : Maintenance Action

Situations

Aircraft.Make Model.Value : 04A.10

Aircraft.Aircraft Component.Value : 25.61

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Narrative :

VIRTUALLY THE ENTIRE AIRBUS FLEET HAS ILLEGAL CARGO SIDEWALL REPAIRS. PER ACR REPAIR DOCUMENT, DAMAGE TO THE COMPOSITE STRUCTURE MUST BE FILLED IN WITH FIRE RETARDANT FILLER MATERIAL. MOST AIRBUSES HAVE SPD PATCHES INSTALLED WITHOUT REPAIRING THE COMPOSITE SANDWICH. I FOUND SUCH A REPAIR ON XYZ ON JAN/XA/00. I BELIEVE ALL THE SPD PATCHES INSTALLED DON'T HAVE THE PROPER REPAIR BENEATH THE SURFACE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE AIRBUS 300 FLEET CARGO COMPARTMENT COMPOSITE LINERS ARE NOT BEING REPAIRED PER THE ACR SUPPLEMENT TO THE STRUCTURAL REPAIR MANUAL. THE RPTR SAID THE TEAR OR HOLE IN THE 0.250 INCH THICK COMPOSITE REQUIRES A FIRE RETARDANT FILLER MATERIAL TO COVER THE DAMAGED AREA AND THEN A 'QUICK STICK' PATCH OVER THE FIRE RETARDANT FILLER MATERIAL. THE RPTR SAID THIS IS NOT BEING DONE CONSISTENTLY DUE TO SCHEDULE PRESSURE AND A REPAIR IS MADE USING ONLY THE 'QUICK STICK' 0.090 INCH THICK FIBERGLASS PATCH. THE RPTR STATED A FIBERGLASS REPAIR IS ONLY PERMITTED ON OTHER ACFT WITH THIN WALL CARGO COMPARTMENT LINERS.

Synopsis :

AN AIRBUS 300 WAS DISPATCHED AND OPERATED IN NON-COMPLIANCE WITH UNAPPROVED REPAIRS MADE TO THE CARGO COMPARTMENT COMPOSITE LINERS.

Time

Date : 200002

Day : Thu

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft / 1

Make Model : B767-300

Component / 1

Aircraft Component : Lubrication Oil

Aircraft Reference : X

Problem : Malfunctioning

Person / 1

ASRS Report : 462932

Person / 2

ASRS Report : 462933

Person / 4

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Person / 5

Function.Flight Crew : Relief Pilot

Person / 3

Function.Oversight : PIC

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

ASRS Report : 462481

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 3

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 4

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Declared Emergency

Consequence.Other : Maintenance Action

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

ON FEB/XA/00, MECHANIC ABC AND MYSELF TAXIED ACFT XYZ FROM THE INTL HARDSTAND AREA TO GATE XB. UPON ATTEMPTING TO START THE #1 ENG, NO ROTATION WAS OBSERVED. AFTER ARRIVING AT GATE XB, WE AGAIN TRIED TO MANUALLY START THE #1 ENG. AGAIN, NO ROTATION WAS OBSERVED, WHICH LED US TO CHANGE THE ENG STARTER. WE PROCEEDED TO CHANGE THE STARTER ACCORDING TO THE MAINT MANUAL. TO THE BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE DURING THE TIME OF THE CHANGE, ALL COMPONENTS RELATED TO THE CHANGE APPEARED TO BE IN GOOD WORKING ORDER. AS A PRECAUTION, THE START VALVE WAS ALSO REPLACED AT THIS TIME. AN OPERATIONAL CHECK OF THE SYS PROVED TO BE OK. NO DEFECTS OR LEAKS NOTED. WE PROCEEDED TO DOCUMENT OUR WORK ACCOMPLISHED. WE LATER LEARNED THAT FLT YX RETURNED TO ZZZ DUE TO OIL LOSS INDICATIONS ON THE #1 ENG. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE #1 ENG STARTER AND STARTER VALVE WERE REPLACED PER THE MAINT MANUAL AND AN OPERATIONAL CHECK WAS ACCOMPLISHED ON THE GATE. THE RPTR STATED NO LEAKS WERE NOTED ON THE IDLE ENG RUN. THE RPTR SAID THAT WHEN THE ACFT RETURNED, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE STARTER DRIVE SEAL WAS DAMAGED, ALLOWING THE ENG OIL LOSS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR OF ACN 462933 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE STARTER WAS REPLACED AND CHECKED PER THE MAINT MANUAL AND CHECKED OK. THE RPTR SAID NO LEAKS WERE OBSERVED ON THE ENG IDLE RUN ON THE GATE. THE RPTR SAID THE CAUSE OF THE OIL LEAK IS REPORTED TO BE A CUT SEAL ON THE STARTER DRIVE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR OF ACN 462481 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR SAID THE ACFT WAS A B767-300ER WITH GENERAL ELECTRIC CF-6 80A ENGINES. THE RPTR STATED THE LOSS OF OIL WAS VERY SLOW AND AT FIRST THOUGHT TO BE AN OIL QUANTITY INDICATION PROB. BUT AS TIME PASSED, IT WAS OBVIOUS IT WAS LEAKING AND WOULD REQUIRE THE ENG BEING SHUT DOWN. THE RPTR SAID THE MAINT RPT ON THE CAUSE OF THE OIL LOSS WAS A DAMAGED OIL DRIVE SEAL.

Synopsis :

A B767-300ER AT CRUISE DECLARES AN EMER AND DIVERTS DUE TO LOSS OF OIL PRESSURE AND QUANTITY CAUSED BY A DAMAGED #1 ENG STARTER DRIVE SEAL.